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I. Introduction 
The image of the disproportionately African-American and 
poor urban jury redistributing wealth has dominated the political 
debate surrounding the tort system for the past generation. Peter 
Huber, a leading spokesperson for the tort reform movement in 
its early years, argued that “[i]f the new tort system cannot find a 
careless defendant after an accident, it will often settle for a 
merely wealthy one.”1 In The Bonfire of the Vanities, novelist Tom 
                                                                                                     
 1. See PETER HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS 
CONSEQUENCES 12 (1988) (asserting further that juries are “committed to 
running a generous sort of charity”); see also Sidle v. Majors, 341 N.E.2d 763, 
771 (Ind. 1976) (acknowledging “the ‘Robin Hood’ proclivity of juries” and noting 
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Wolfe characterized any jury in Bronx County, New York as a 
“vehicle for redistributing the wealth,”2 and, in the process, 
coined the term “Bronx jury.” In the real world, Frank Popoff, 
then President and CEO of Dow Chemical Company, angrily 
argued that the jury was all black after it returned a $75 million 
dollar punitive damage verdict against his company.3  
This Article examines how judicial and legislative perceptions 
that race and income inequality affect jury deliberations impact 
the substance of a state’s articulated rules governing tort law.4 
Our focus is not on whether the racial composition or degree of 
income inequality within the population from which the jury pool 
is drawn in fact affects jury determinations of either liability or 
damages.5 Instead, we examine whether appellate courts, 
consciously or subconsciously fearing that urban juries will be 
unfair to businesses and insured defendants, strike preemptively 
to prevent tort cases from ever reaching juries.6 We also consider 
whether a state’s history as part of the South and the political 
leanings of its government affect whether its substantive law 
makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to reach the jury.7  
Beginning in the mid-1960s, American tort law shifted 
dramatically in a pro-plaintiff direction.8 The common element 
                                                                                                     
that “[t]he tendency to take from the rich and give to the needy is as American 
as apple pie”).  
 2. TOM WOLFE, THE BONFIRE OF THE VANITIES 406 (Picador 2008) (1987); see 
also Frank M. McClellan, The Dark Side of Tort Reform: Searching for Racial 
Justice, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 761, 784 (1996) (arguing that “the only institutions 
in America where people of color have the power to make immediate wealth 
redistribution decisions are urban governments and juries”). 
 3. See MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE 
CHALLENGES OF MASS TOXIC SUBSTANCES LITIGATION 286–87 (1996) (pointing out 
that after making this statement, Popoff immediately had to backtrack to avoid 
accusations of racism).  
 4. See infra Part III (identifying and discussing factors that commonly 
decide which states follow traditional tort doctrines restricting liability in 
personal injury cases). 
 5. See infra notes 182–185 and accompanying text (discussing how 
demographics impact the way juries make decisions).  
 6. See infra Part IV (describing how the Jury Access Denial Index (JADI) 
is used to evaluate the appellate courts of various states). 
 7. See infra Part IV.B (noting that in many instances, Southern courts 
appear to be more inclined to prevent cases from reaching juries). 
 8. See Robert L. Rabin, Judge Jack Weinstein and the World of Tort: 
Institutional and Historical Perspectives, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. 641, 641 (2015)  
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among the many changes that occurred during the following two 
decades was that they enabled personal injury victims to have 
their cases decided by juries rather than dismissed by trial 
judges. Although these changes were pervasive, they were not 
uniform among the states. Some states, notably California,9 often 
were bellwethers of pro-plaintiff changes in tort law, while other 
states, particularly some in the South, failed to join the trend. 
These pro-plaintiff changes exhausted themselves in the late 
1980s when they were checked by pro-defendant “tort reform” 
enacted by state legislatures facing intense political backlash 
from businesses and insurance companies.10  
We begin with the hypothesis that judges and state 
legislators often believe that juries with a substantial percentage 
of African-American or low-income jurors are more inclined to 
find for personal injury victims and award them higher damages 
and that these perceptions have led them to adopt rules making 
                                                                                                     
It is conventional wisdom that tort law entered a new era . . . around 
1960 . . . cut[ting] across virtually all categories of liability for 
unintentional injury. These developments included recognition of new 
and expansive duties of . . . care in personal injury claims for 
landowner liability . . . and eroded existing defenses (contributory 
negligence . . .) and immunities . . . .  
See also DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS 
§ 27 (2d ed. 2014) (“It is probably fair to say that tort law expanded the rights of 
injured persons during much of the 20th century at various rates of expansion 
up until around 1980 or perhaps a little earlier.” (footnote omitted)). Most often, 
these changes resulted from judicial decisions. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 
532 P.2d 1226, 1242 (Cal. 1975) (adopting pure comparative fault); Mounsey v. 
Ellard, 297 N.E.2d 43, 51 (Mass. 1973) (holding that “we no longer follow the 
common law distinction between licensees and invitees and, instead, create a 
common duty of reasonable care which the occupier owes to all lawful visitors”). 
But in a number of instances, the pro-plaintiff changes came from legislative 
action. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1116 (c) (2014) (adopting modified 
comparative liability); N.J. STAT. § 2A:22A-5 (2015) (establishing dramshop 
liability).  
 9. See Peter H. Schuck, Introduction to TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST: COMPETITION, INNOVATION, AND CONSUMER WELFARE 1, 19 (Peter H. 
Schuck ed., 1991) (describing “the California, New Jersey, and New York courts” 
as “being in the vanguard” as they “imposed new, more expansive duties to 
protect or avoid harm to others”).  
 10. See Joseph Sanders & Craig Joyce, “Off to the Races”: The 1980s Tort 
Crisis and the Law Reform Process, 27 HOUS. L. REV. 207, 210–11 (1990) 
(reporting that “the great majority of states . . . enacted tort reform legislation 
between 1985 and 1988 . . . in response to an insurance crisis”).  
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it more difficult for plaintiffs to have their cases decided by 
juries.11 
We further examine whether a state’s history as part of the 
slaveholding South, a factor obviously linked with race, correlates 
with a higher degree of denying personal injury plaintiffs access 
to juries.12 Southern states typically have adopted more 
conservative policies on any number of issues, not just those that 
disadvantage personal injury plaintiffs.13 For example, economist 
Paul Krugman noted that it was mostly formerly slaveholding 
Southern states that refused, under the Affordable Care Act, to 
expand Medicaid to “provide major benefits to millions of their 
citizens, pour billions into their economies, and help support their 
health-care providers,” all on the federal government’s tab.14 He 
asked, “Is America doomed to live forever politically in the 
shadow of slavery?”15 We ask the same question in the context of 
tort law. 
During the period extending from the mid-1960s through the 
mid-1980s, Southern judges often refused to adopt pro-plaintiff 
doctrines in tort law that would have made it easier for plaintiffs 
to have their cases decided by the jury.16 They apparently feared 
that Southern blacks, many only recently registered to vote and 
serving as jurors in significant numbers for the first time, would 
seek to redistribute wealth or retaliate for historic, and often 
continuing, mistreatment.17 Accordingly, we assess the effect that 
                                                                                                     
 11. See infra Part III.A (reporting that, even today, many trial lawyers are 
convinced that black juries are pro-plaintiff). 
 12. See infra Part III.B (explaining that both Southern courts and 
businesses feared black jurors would use their power in the court to strike back 
at those whom they felt oppressed them). 
 13. See Paul Krugman, Opinion, Slavery’s Long Shadow, N.Y. TIMES (June 
22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/22/opinion/paul-krugman-slaverys-
long-shadow.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2016) (noting that Southern whites have 
had very strong Republican leanings ever since the Nixon administration) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id.  
 16. See infra Part III.B (explaining how a mixture of Southern suspicion of 
African-American jurors, together with the South’s pro-business politics of the 
1960s, influenced courts not to adopt increasingly pro-plaintiff tort doctrines 
that prevailed elsewhere). 
 17. See infra Part III.A.1 (stating that even today, many attorneys still 
view black jurors as potential social wealth redistributors). 
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being a Southern state has on tort law because of its interactions 
with race and income inequality.18  
We also explore a possible correlation between the political 
leanings of a state’s government and the extent to which its tort 
law makes it difficult for the plaintiff to have her case decided by 
the jury.19 Tort law has become highly politicized in the last 
generation.20 Conservatives attack “out of control” juries that 
imperil American businesses, and they promote pro-business 
“tort reform.”21 In contrast, liberals see the tort system as a 
means of holding corporations accountable for their harmful 
conduct.22 Hence, it is plausible to assume that 
conservative-leaning states impose more obstacles to the plaintiff 
reaching the jury than do liberal-leaning states.23  
The tort law of seventeen states provides the basis for our 
comparisons.24 In order to test for correlations between the extent 
that a state denies personal injury plaintiffs the opportunity to 
                                                                                                     
 18. See infra Part IV.C, E & F (describing how the authors discovered a 
strong association between Southern states whose largest cities include high 
percentages of African-American residents and tort law doctrines making it 
difficult for plaintiffs’ cases to reach the jury). 
 19. See infra Parts III.C & IV.G (describing possible correlation between 
political conservatism and anti-jury doctrines and finding such a correlation in 
1980 but not in 2010). 
 20. See infra notes 250–258 and accompanying text (discussing tort 
reform). 
 21. See Robert A. Levy, Do’s and Don’ts of Tort Reform, CATO INST. (May 
2005), http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/dos-donts-tort-reform (last 
visited Apr. 13, 2016) (listing awards such as a $145 billion punitive damages 
verdict as being an example of tort abuse) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 22. See Brendan Fischer, Justice Denied: 71 ALEC Bills in 2013 Make It 
Harder to Hold Corporations Accountable for Causing Injury or Death, PR 
WATCH (July 10, 2013, 7:31 AM), http://www.prwatch.org/news/2013/ 
07/12172/justice-denied-71-alec-bills-2013-make-it-harder-hold-corporations-
accountable-ca#sthash.Kj90WwvY.dpuf (last visited Apr. 13, 2016) (arguing that 
tort liability is necessary to prevent dangerous corporate actions, citing the 
quintessential example of a crib manufacturer ignoring safety guidelines) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 23. See infra Part III.B.2 (noting that the transition of Southern states 
from Democratic leaning to Republican-leaning in the last half of the twentieth 
century corresponds with the persistence of doctrines making it more difficult 
for personal injury plaintiffs to have their cases heard by juries). 
 24. See infra notes 266–268 and accompanying text (discussing selection of 
states used for comparative study). 
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have their cases decided by the jury and each of the factors of 
race, income inequality, history as a part of the South, or the 
political leanings of state governments, or any combination 
thereof, we constructed a numerical index, the Jury Access 
Denial Index (“JADI”).25 Each state’s JADI quantifies the extent 
to which the tort law of that state impedes a plaintiff’s access to 
the jury compared with the tort law of other states.  
Determining each state’s JADI in turn required two steps. 
First, we selected five sets of legal issues that are important in 
determining which personal injury cases survive the legal 
gauntlet and move forward for jury deliberations. We asked a 
panel of twelve experienced and highly regarded judges and 
practitioners to assess how important each of these factors is in 
comparison to each other in order to assign each its appropriate 
weight in determining the Jury Access Denial Index.26 Second, we 
researched the law on each of these issues in each of the 
seventeen states.27 We then multiplied our quantitative 
assessment of the extent to which each state continued to adhere 
to an older doctrine, such as contributory negligence as a total 
bar to recovery, and the weight assigned to such a factor by the 
panelists experienced in tort litigation. We totaled these products 
for each of the five sets of issues for a particular state to 
determine that state’s JADI. Using each state’s JADI, we 
conclude in Part IV.B by ranking the states in order of the degree 
to which each state’s substantive law doctrines impedes a 
personal injury plaintiff’s ability to have her case decided by the 
jury.28  
Our next step was to perform a multivariate analysis with 
the four variables of income inequality, race, region, and the 
                                                                                                     
 25. See infra Part IV.A (explaining the various criteria behind the JADI 
index). 
 26. See infra note 264 and accompanying text (explaining the selection of 
an equal number of judges, plaintiffs’ attorneys, and defense attorneys). 
 27. See infra Appendix A (describing the research procedures). 
 28. See infra note 269 and accompanying text (noting that the JADI 
measures only the impact of substantive law doctrines in preventing cases from 
reaching the jury and not judicial tendencies in ruling on such matters). 
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political ideology of each state’s government.29 The results 
confirm at least two of our hypotheses.30  
First, a clear positive relationship exists between the 
percentage of African-Americans in a state’s largest cities and its 
continuing acceptance of doctrines that impede the plaintiff’s 
access to the jury.31 This relationship is both statistically and 
substantively significant, and independent of any effects 
resulting from either the degree of income inequality present in 
the state’s large urban areas or the region of the country in which 
the state lies.32 
Second, a state’s geographic location within the South yields 
the most powerful effect on the extent to which the state denies 
jury access to tort plaintiffs; again, this correlation is both 
statistically and substantively significant.33 This finding is not 
surprising because during the late 1960s through the mid-1980s, 
when most other states adopted changes to tort law that 
increased plaintiffs’ access to juries, appellate courts in the South 
often failed to join the trend.34  
Our analysis of whether the other two variables, income 
inequality and political ideology, affect a state’s tort law yields 
less clear results.35 Our findings suggest a weak positive 
association between the degree of income inequality within a 
state’s largest cities and the degree to which its tort law makes it 
difficult for plaintiffs in personal injury cases to have their cases 
                                                                                                     
 29. See infra Part IV.B (recording how the authors chose seventeen states 
that varied in terms of racial demographics, Southern history, politics, and 
common ideologies to provide a complete and diverse analysis). 
 30. See infra Part IV.D (testing for correlation between a state’s tort law 
doctrines and a high percentage of African-Americans in its largest cities); see 
also infra Part IV.E (looking for correlations between the JADI score of a 
particular state and its history as part of the South). 
 31. See infra Part IV.D. 
 32. See infra Part IV.C (expounding upon how the Gini coefficient was used 
to determine income inequality).  
 33. See infra Part IV.E (illustrating this conclusion). 
 34. See infra Appendix A, tbl.3 (reporting that during the mid-1900s, 
Southern courts often retained judicial doctrines making it more difficult for 
plaintiffs to have their cases heard by juries). 
 35. See infra Part IV.F (explaining that findings of associations from 
bivariate analyses should not be over-interpreted because of complex 
interactions with other variables). 
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decided by juries.36 Surprisingly, however, the correlation is not 
statistically significant.37 
Finally, our analysis suggests that the relationship between 
the political leanings of a state’s government and its degree of 
jury-access denial is somewhat complicated.38 On one hand, as 
anticipated, we found a positive correlation between the extent to 
which a state’s tort law impeded a plaintiff’s access to the jury 
and its level of political conservatism in 1980—at the end of the 
period when most courts had moved tort law in a decidedly pro-
plaintiff direction.39 On the other hand, when we tested the 
relationship between political conservatism and jury-access 
denial in 2010, the association has actually reversed: a state’s 
level of conservatism is now correlated with easier access to the 
jury.40 This can be partially explained by the fact that tort law 
has remained comparatively stable since the mid-1980s, while the 
political leanings of state governments have often changed 
dramatically. Even accounting for these changes, however, we 
conclude that race and region are far better predictors of a state’s 
JADI than is political ideology.41 
Part II considers the role of substantive legal doctrines in 
determining whether the personal injury victim is able to have 
her case decided by the jury.42 Subpart A describes the expansion 
of jury access for plaintiffs that was concentrated in the two 
decades between the mid-1960s and the mid-1980s.43 Subpart B 
                                                                                                     
 36. See infra note 278 and accompanying text (analyzing the data on 
income inequality). 
 37. See infra note 277 and accompanying text (analyzing the connection 
between jury awards and income inequality and concluding no statistically 
significant relationship). 
 38. See infra Part IV.G (discussing the complications when analyzing JADI 
and political orientations of state governments). 
 39. See infra note 283 and accompanying text (noting that Figure 5 shows 
that in 1980, more liberal states generally had adopted tort doctrines making it 
easier for plaintiffs to have their cases reach juries). 
 40. See infra note 284 and accompanying text (observing that by 2010, 
liberal political leanings of state governments were associated with a greater 
prevalence of anti-jury tort doctrines). 
 41. See infra Part IV.G (explaining that a correlation between JADI and 
political ideology was expected, but only a confusing and inconsistent 
association was found). 
 42. Infra Part II. 
 43. Infra Part II.A. 
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then identifies five sets of substantive rules that traditionally 
kept plaintiffs’ cases from juries and continue to do so in a 
minority of states: (1) contributory negligence as a total bar to 
recovery; (2) limited duty rules in premises liability cases; (3) no 
duty or limited duty rules in other contexts; (4) rules limiting the 
liability of charitable institutions; and (5) restrictive rules 
governing the admissibility of expert scientific testimony.44 
In Part III, we review several variables that scholars, 
practitioners, or judges have identified as affecting the 
development of tort law.45 Subpart A describes the widely held 
belief among practitioners and some scholars that 
African-American jurors favor plaintiffs in personal injury 
litigation, both in determining liability and in assessing 
damages.46 The Subpart also covers the often overlapping topic of 
whether low-income jurors tend to favor plaintiffs and 
redistribute wealth in tort litigation.47 Subpart B explores the 
reasons why the substantive law in states that were once a part 
of the segregated South potentially poses more obstacles to 
personal injury plaintiffs seeking to have their cases decided by 
juries than does the law in other regions of the country.48 Finally, 
Subpart C considers a possible alternative explanation, that the 
substantive law rules we identified may be most closely 
correlated with the political leanings of a state’s governmental 
leaders.49 
Part IV describes our methodology for testing the hypotheses 
that we derived from the analysis previously presented, as well as 
the results of our analysis.50 Subpart A explains the process for 
developing a Jury Access Denial Index that quantifies the extent 
to which any particular state’s law creates obstacles for the 
personal injury plaintiff to have her case decided by the jury 
instead of having it dismissed by the trial court judge.51 Subpart 
                                                                                                     
 44. Infra Part II.B. 
 45. Infra Part III. 
 46. Infra Part III.A. 
 47. Infra Part III.A. 
 48. Infra Part III.B. 
 49. Infra Part III.C. 
 50. Infra Part IV. 
 51. Infra Part IV.A. 
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B describes how we selected the seventeen states whose tort law 
we studied.52 We then rank the seventeen states in terms of their 
JADIs, that is, the degree to which the law of each state creates 
substantive law obstacles to the plaintiff having her case decided 
by the jury.53  
The later Subparts of Part IV evaluate whether there are 
statistically significant correlations between the extent to which 
each state’s law impedes access to the jury and the factors, 
previously described in Part II, that may affect the extent of jury 
access denial.54 In Subpart C, we evaluate whether a state’s JADI 
is correlated with the degree of income inequality within a state’s 
largest municipalities.55 Subpart D considers whether a state’s 
JADI is correlated with the percentage of African-Americans in 
the populations of the state’s largest cities.56 In Subpart E, we 
test the possible impact of a state’s history as part of the South.57 
In Subpart F, we evaluate possible interactions among the 
variables of race, income inequality, and regional history in 
affecting its JADI.58 Finally, Subpart G considers whether the 
political ideology of a state’s government and its voters is 
correlated with a state’s JADI.59  
In Part V, we conclude and briefly address the normative 
implications of our findings.60  
II. The Role of Substantive Law in Denying Plaintiffs Access to 
Juries 
The most important issue in the practice of personal injury 
law is how difficult it is for plaintiffs to have their cases heard by 
                                                                                                     
 52. Infra Part IV.B. 
 53. Infra Part IV.B. 
 54. Infra Part IV.G. 
 55. Infra Part IV.C. 
 56. Infra Part IV.D. 
 57. Infra Part IV.E. 
 58. Infra Part IV.F. 
 59. Infra Part IV.G. 
 60. Infra Part V. 
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juries.61 Judges and attorneys assume that juries will favor 
injured victims and not defendants—typically either businesses 
or other insured defendants.62 Most tort claims are resolved out of 
court through the settlement process,63 but the perceptions of 
                                                                                                     
 61. See generally HARRY SHULMAN ET AL., LAW OF TORTS: CASES AND 
MATERIALS (6th ed. 2015) 
[I]n most cases, the lawyer for the plaintiff wants the case to be heard 
and decided by the jury. . . . Conversely, the lawyer representing the 
defendant wants to prevent the jury from deciding the case. 
Accordingly, much of the tort litigation process can be understood as 
the struggle between the plaintiff’s attorney and defense counsel as to 
whether the case will be decided by the jury or whether instead it will 
be decided by the judge “as a matter of law.”  
Cf. J. Maria Glover, The Federal Rules of Civil Settlement, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1713, 1738 (2012) (describing impact of court’s decision taking case from jury 
through granting of summary judgment motion on settlement value). As early 
as the mid-nineteenth century, a New York trial court judge explicitly addressed 
the issue:  
We can not shut our eyes to the fact that in certain controversies 
between the weak and the strong—between a humble individual and 
a gigantic corporation, the sympathies of the human mind naturally, 
honestly and generously, run to the assistance and support of the 
feeble, and apparently oppressed; and that compassion will 
sometimes exercise over the deliberations of a jury, an influence 
which, however honorable to them as philanthropists, is wholly 
inconsistent with the principles of law and the ends of justice. There, 
is therefore, a manifest propriety in withdrawing from the 
consideration of the jury, those cases in which the plaintiff fails to 
show a right of recovery . . . . 
Haring v. New York & E.R. Co., 13 Barb. 9, 15–16 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1852). 
 62. See, e.g., 2 FRED LANE, GOLDSTEIN TRIAL TECHNIQUE § 9:2 (3d ed. 2014) 
(advising that “[t]he ‘little guy’ usually has an advantage with a jury . . . against 
a corporation, a prominent or wealthy person, a railroad, or an insurance 
company”). But see LYNN LANGTON & THOMAS H. COHEN, NCJ-223851, CIVIL 
BENCH AND JURY TRIALS IN STATE COURTS, 2005, at 3–4 (rev. ed. 2009), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cbjtsc05.pdf (reporting that a comprehensive 
study by the U.S. Department of Justice shows that the plaintiffs won in only 
51.3% of all tort cases).  
 63. See Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What Is the Settlement 
Rate and Why Should We Care?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111, 129 (2009) 
(finding a settlement rate in a sample of tort cases in federal courts to be 87.2%); 
Jason Scott Johnston & Joel Waldfogel, Does Repeat Play Elicit Cooperation? 
Evidence from Federal Civil Litigation, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 39, 40 (2002) (finding 
“settlement rates for some type of cases—such as torts—exceeding 90 percent”).  
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counsel for the parties as to whether a case will reach the jury is 
certainly an important determinant of settlement value.64  
In this Part, we identify five sets of substantive law 
doctrines65 that affect whether the trial judge will grant either a 
motion for a summary judgment or a motion for a directed 
verdict, removing the case from the purview of the jury. Even 
earlier in the litigation process, plaintiff’s counsel in a personal 
injury case, almost always compensated on a contingent fee 
basis,66 generally declines to accept a case when the facts suggest 
that the case is unlikely to make it to the jury.  
Factors other than the content of substantive law, notably 
state or even local judicial practice, significantly affect the 
probability that the trial judge will dismiss cases,67 but our focus 
is only on substantive legal principles that play important roles 
in dismissing tort cases. Before identifying doctrines that deny 
the tort plaintiff access to the jury, we begin by tracing how most 
states moved, during the period of the mid-1960s through the 
mid-1980s, toward making it easier for tort plaintiffs to have 
their cases decided by juries.  
                                                                                                     
 64. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2465 (2004) (“The conventional wisdom is that litigants 
bargain toward settlement in the shadow of expected trial outcomes.”).  
 65. One of the issues, the admissibility of expert testimony, is really a 
matter of evidence law rather than tort law, but substantially impacts whether 
the tort case is heard by the jury. See infra notes 129–147 and accompanying 
text (explaining the standards for qualifying experts). 
 66. See Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency 
Fee Legal Practice, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 267, 267 n.1 (1998) (reporting that in 
“personal injury cases . . . research shows that virtually all plaintiffs pay their 
lawyers on a contingency basis”).  
 67. See, e.g., Joe S. Cecil et al., A Quarter-Century of Summary Judgment 
Practice in Six Federal District Courts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 861, 902 
(2007) (acknowledging that variations in “circuit law, local rules, and case-
management practices . . . and judicial philosophies . . . across the districts” 
influence the variations in summary judgment filing and grant rates across 
those districts).  
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A. The Expansion of Jury Access in Tort Law 
During the classical era of tort law,68 extending from the late 
nineteenth century into the mid-twentieth century, judges 
frequently articulated specific rules that enabled them to decide 
cases as a matter of law without submitting them to the jury. 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., the most influential torts theorist of 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, reasoned that 
“[i]f . . . the ordinary liabilities in tort arise from failure to comply 
with fixed and uniform standards of external conduct, . . . it ought 
to be possible . . . to formulate these standards . . . and . . . to do 
so must . . . be the business of the court.”69 Professor (later Judge 
and then Justice) Holmes continued, “A judge . . . ought gradually 
to acquire a fund of experience which enables him to represent 
the common sense of the community in ordinary instances far 
better than an average jury. . . . [T]he sphere in which he is able 
to rule without taking their opinion at all should be continually 
growing.”70 Edward White, in his history of American tort law, 
writes that “[a]s a judge, Holmes enjoyed taking negligence cases 
away from the jury.”71 
The rule-based approach of Holmes and his contemporaries 
came under attack by the legal realist movement during the 
period beginning in the 1920s and lasting into the 1950s.72 As 
Harry Shulman and Fleming James, Jr., realist editors of a 
                                                                                                     
 68. We refer to the classical era of tort law as the period beginning with the 
emergence of negligence “as a comprehensive principle of tort law . . . that came 
to dominate tort law,” and extended, with ebbs and flows, until the period of the 
mid-1960s. See G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL 
HISTORY 13 (expanded ed. 2003) (describing how it was during the classical era 
of tort law that Holmes first “isolate[ed] . . . negligence as a comprehensive 
principle of tort law”). 
 69. OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 111, 124 (Little, Brown, and 
Co. 1923) (1881).  
 70. Id. at 124; see also Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 
70 (1927) (Holmes, J.) (“It is true . . . that the question of due care very generally 
is left to the jury. But we are dealing with a standard of conduct, and when the 
standard is clear it should be laid down once for all by the Courts.”).  
 71. WHITE, supra note 68, at 58 (summarizing this perspective and stating 
that “[i]t was not difficult for scientists to see the subversive effect of jury 
determinations on the theoretical integrity of tort law”).  
 72. See LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927–1960, 1, 14–17, 229–
30 (1986) (describing the origins, growth, and development of the legal realist 
movement). 
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leading torts casebook explained, the focus of tort law is “not so 
much with rule or doctrine as with problems in human 
relations,”73 a characterization suggesting an increased role for 
the jury.74 However, judges and scholars continued to crave 
“order and coherence in the law.”75 During the post-World War II 
period, judges remained institutionally conservative and largely 
preserved the rules of an earlier era that denied plaintiffs access 
to juries.76 William Prosser, probably the most influential torts 
scholar of his generation, served as the reporter for the Second 
Restatement of Torts and as the author of an influential treatise, 
a leading casebook, and numerous articles.77 Despite Prosser’s 
post-realist recognition of the importance of policy, the core of his 
work was that he “classified and simplified doctrine.”78 In other 
words, his tort scholarship helped perpetuate the rule-based 
                                                                                                     
 73. HARRY SCHULMAN & FLEMING JAMES, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE 
LAW OF TORTS, at vii (1942).  
 74. Cf. Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses and 
Personal Injury Claims, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 253, (2004) (describing “the 
jury’s role as enunciator of behavioral norms”); Catherine Pierce Wells, Tort 
Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justification for Jury Adjudication, 88 
MICH. L. REV. 2348, 2409 (1990) (concluding that “most tort verdicts 
are . . . based on a consensus . . . [by] juries [that] normally include a cross 
section or normative viewpoints”). 
 75. WHITE, supra note 68, at 91. 
 76. See id. at 167 (“The renewed sense among postwar legal scholars that 
in a modern interdependent society even small changes in the law had the 
potential to generate large and unforeseen ripples proved to be a deterrent 
strong enough to hold back sweeping proposals for reform of common law 
negligence.”); see also HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL 
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MARKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 568–69 
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (1958) (listing 
advantages of stare decisis as (1) helping people plan their lives based on 
established law, (2) establishing “fair and efficient adjudication,” and 
(3) building “public confidence in the judiciary”); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & 
Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to the Legal Process, in 
id. at i, iii (stating that The Legal Process “provided the name, the agenda, and 
much of the analytical structure for a generation of legal thoughts . . . that 
became deeply entrenched . . . in the 1950s and for some time thereafter”).  
 77. See Christopher J. Robinette, The Prosser Notebook: Classroom as 
Biography and Intellectual History, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 577, 579–80 (describing 
Prosser’s contributions as Reporter of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, as 
author of a leading treatise and influential articles, and as editor of the leading 
casebook). 
 78. WHITE, supra note 68, at 177.  
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regime of tort law that Holmes had pioneered and, in the process, 
Prosser enabled judges to continue to dismiss cases.79 
During the period of the late-1960s through the mid-1980s, 
the dam that Holmes and Prosser had constructed broke, and 
most courts began submitting far more cases to juries.80 Judge 
Guido Calabresi, one of the most influential torts theorists of this 
new era, explained: “[T]he so-called Holmes view—that standards 
of conduct ought increasingly to be fixed by the court for the sake 
of certainty—has been largely rejected . . . . The tendency has 
been away from fixed standards and towards enlarging the 
sphere of the jury.”81 However, “the tendency” described by Judge 
Calabresi is manifested in some states far more than in others.82 
B. Tort Doctrines that Deny Plaintiffs Access to Juries 
In the remainder of this Part, we describe five sets of rules 
that have played a gate-keeping function in preventing personal 
injury plaintiffs from having their cases decided by juries.83 
These examples certainly do not comprise the entire set of legal 
doctrines that may prevent plaintiffs from having their cases 
heard by juries. Rather, we selected them because of their 
importance in denying plaintiffs access to juries and because 
virtually every state has considered each of these issues and 
taken a position on them.84 At the same time, in an effort to 
                                                                                                     
 79. See id. (explaining how Prosser merely sought to facilitate efficiency in 
the current regime, rather than actual reforms).  
 80. See Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 170 F.3d 264, 268 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(describing the “secular decline of the Holmes position” and the fact that the 
New York judiciary has adopted the opposing Knowlton viewpoint). 
 81. Id. (quoting Nuckoles v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 372 F.2d 286, 289 (4th 
Cir. 1967)).  
 82. See infra Part IV.B (explaining that not all states have moved to the 
same extent towards providing more access to jury trials; hence the JADI 
studies and their relevancy to this topic). 
 83. See infra Parts II.B.1–5 (identifying the five sets of rules as 
(1) contributory negligence and comparative fault, (2) premises liability limited 
duty rules, (3) other no-duty and limited-duty rules, (4) charitable institution 
liability, and (5) scientific expert qualification standards). 
 84. See, e.g., infra Part II.B.1 (explaining that the doctrine of contributory 
negligence as a complete bar used to be nearly universal across the fifty states, 
but now is very limited after most states decided to alter their existing tort laws 
on the issue). 
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accurately reflect the extent of jury access denial of each state’s 
comprehensive tort law considered as a package, we also 
attempted to identify categories of issues that affected various 
tort specialties. For example, on one hand, contributory 
negligence often plays an important role in denying plaintiffs 
access to juries in automobile and premises slip-and-fall cases, 
but far less frequently in medical malpractice cases.85 On the 
other hand, the qualifications required to qualify a scientist or 
engineer to testify as an expert witness typically is critical to 
whether or not the jury decides the case in the areas of products 
liability and medical malpractice, but is of much less significance 
in enabling cases to be considered by juries in most automobile 
and premises liability cases.86 Similarly, when we selected the 
plaintiffs’ attorneys and defense counsel who assisted us in 
quantifying the relative importance of the five sets of 
jury-access-denial doctrines, we also considered both their 
current practice specialties and their past experiences with other 
types of tort cases.  
1. The Choice Between Contributory Negligence and Comparative 
Fault 
At least until the late 1960s, virtually all jurisdictions 
followed the rule that any contributory negligence on the part of 
the plaintiff barred her action against the defendant.87 Today, 
that rule prevails in only four states and the District of 
Columbia.88 The change from contributory negligence as a total 
                                                                                                     
 85. See Neil Vidmar, Pap and Circumstance: What Jury Verdict Statistics 
Can Tell Us About Jury Behavior and the Tort System, 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 
1205, 1222 (1994) (noting that “[a]utomobile cases may involve contributory 
negligence, which is not claimed as often in malpractice cases”).  
 86. See id. (observing that “[m]edical malpractice lawyers tend to . . . invest 
heavily in experts, whereas generalist lawyers who often call few or no experts 
litigate automobile cases”); see also infra notes 129–131 and accompanying text 
(explaining how judges accustomed to expert testimony on liability are quicker 
to dismiss cases when the plaintiffs lack experts). 
 87. See VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 1.01 (5th ed. 
2010) (reporting that in 1950, forty-five states followed the rule that 
contributory negligence was a total bar to recovery).  
 88. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 17 cmt. a, 
rptrs’ note (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
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bar to plaintiff’s recovery to a comparative fault standard, under 
which plaintiff’s recovery is reduced but not eliminated by any 
fault on the plaintiff’s part,89 is widely acknowledged to have 
been “among this generation’s most important tort law 
developments.”90  
The most important consequence of the change to 
comparative fault is that the jury decides far more negligence 
cases.91 Under the older rule of contributory negligence, trial 
judges frequently kept cases from going to the jury by either 
granting the defendant’s motion for a summary judgment before 
trial, or, more often, its motion for a directed verdict at trial on 
the grounds that the plaintiff had been contributorily negligent 
as a matter of law and therefore the plaintiff was not entitled to 
recover.92  
2. Limited Duty Rules in Premises Liability Cases 
During the first two-thirds of the twentieth century, at least 
three separate sets of limited-duty and no-duty rules affected the 
outcomes of litigation brought by those tortiously injured while 
visitors to the defendant’s premises. In some states, these 
                                                                                                     
 89. See Donald G. Gifford & Christopher J. Robinette, Apportioning 
Liability in Maryland Tort Cases: Time to End Contributory Negligence and 
Joint and Several Liability, 73 MD. L. REV. 701, 708–09 (2014) (stating that 
under the pure form of comparative fault, the plaintiff’s recovery is determined 
by multiplying her or his damages by the defendant’s percentage of fault; but 
under modified comparative fault, a plaintiff who is more than or equally at 
fault than the defendant recovers nothing).  
 90. Andrew R. Klein, Comparative Fault and Fraud, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 983, 
983 (2006).  
 91. See Ellen M. Bublick, Comparative Fault to the Limits, 56 VAND. L. REV. 
977, 1042 (2003) (“Comparative fault was meant to decrease the role of judges 
and give more cases to the jury . . . and it undoubtedly has done so.”). 
 92. See Wex S. Malone, The Formative Era of Contributory Negligence, 41 
ILL. L. REV. 151, 169 (1946) (describing contributory negligence as “an ingenious 
device which gave the court almost complete freedom to accept or reject jury 
participation at its pleasure”); Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Contributory Negligence: A 
Necessary Check on the American Jury, 43 A.B.A. J. 1005, 1007 (1957) (“[T]he 
common-law rule of contributory negligence performs a necessary function as a 
‘check and balance’ on the American jury.”); Gregory D. Smith, Contributory 
Negligence as a Matter of Law: The Last Vestiges, 23 TORT & INS. L.J. 674, 677–
78 (1987) (describing the decline of the once widespread practice of ruling 
“contributory negligence as a matter of law”). 
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doctrines that made it easier for judges to keep cases away from 
the jury remain largely intact, while in other states, they have 
been largely eliminated.93  
Traditionally, the first limitation on the liability of the land 
possessor was that his liability depended upon whether the 
plaintiff was an invitee,94 a licensee,95 or a trespasser.96 Only an 
invitee was owed the general standard of reasonable care under 
the circumstances.97 Courts in nineteenth-century England 
originally created the limitations on the duty of care owed by land 
possessors to licensees and trespassers “to disgorge the jury of 
some of its power by . . . allowing the judge to take the case from 
the jury.”98 Just as courts today fear that African-American and 
low-income jurors identify with victims more than they do with 
businesses and other defendants, nineteenth-century courts were 
concerned that “juries were comprised mainly of potential land 
entrants who most likely would act to protect the community at 
large and thereby rein in the landowner’s sovereign power over 
his land.”99 The trial judge was able to dismiss cases in which the 
land possessor’s conduct, while arguably unreasonable, did not 
satisfy the more stringent requirements of liability owed to a 
                                                                                                     
 93. See infra Appendix A, tbl.2 (noting the entries for each of the seventeen 
states under the category of “Limited or No-Duty Rules in Premises Cases”).  
 94. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) 
(defining an invitee as someone who enters onto land either “for a purpose 
directly connected with business dealings with the possessor of that land” or “as 
a member of the public for a purpose for which the land is held open to the 
public”). 
 95. See id. § 330 (defining a “licensee [as] a person who is privileged to 
enter or remain on land only by virtue of the possessor’s consent” and listing 
“social guests,” among others). 
 96. See id. § 329 (defining a trespasser as someone “who enters or remains 
upon land . . . of another without . . . privilege . . . [or] consent”).  
 97. See FOWLER V. HARPER, FLEMING JAMES, JR. & OSCAR S. GRAY, HARPER, 
JAMES & GRAY ON TORTS § 27.12 (3d ed. 2008) (“The occupier’s duty to the invitee 
is one of due care in all circumstances.”). 
 98. See Nelson v. Freeland, 507 S.E.2d 882, 892 (N.C. 1998) (abolishing the 
distinction in duty of care owed to invitees and licensees); see also Carl S. 
Hawkins, Premises Liability After Repudiation of the Status Categories: 
Allocation of Judge and Jury Functions, 1981 UTAH L. REV. 15, 18 (1981) 
(stating that “the formal status rules . . . have kept many cases from juries”). 
 99. Freeland, 507 S.E.2d at 887; see also Norman S. Marsh, The History 
and Comparative Law of Invitees, Licensees, and Trespassers, 69 LAW Q. REV. 
182, 189 (1953).  
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licensee.100 Many jurisdictions, however, shifted their positions on 
this issue during the late 1960s through the mid-1980s and now 
apply a general negligence standard to both invitees and 
licensees, thereby making it easier for licensees to have their 
cases decided by juries.101 
The second limitation on the liability of landowners under 
common law was that, traditionally, a landlord, with a few 
specific exceptions, was not liable to a visitor to his land who 
sustained injuries while visiting the leased premises.102 Unless 
there was evidence that the injury of the visitor to the leased 
premises fell into an exception, the trial judge dismissed the 
case.103 In some states, the limitation on the landlord’s liability 
for an injury occurring to a visitor to the leased premises has 
been reduced or eliminated.104 As a result, visitors injured on 
leased premises are more likely to have their cases decided by 
juries than their counterparts in states following the traditional 
rules.105  
                                                                                                     
 100. See HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 97, §§ 27.9–27.10 (stating that 
the land occupier “need not inspect the premises to discover defects or other 
dangerous conditions” and detailing other ways in which the standard of care 
owed is less than that of a reasonable person).  
 101. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 51 
cmt. a, rptrs’ note (AM. LAW INST. 2012) (identifying twenty-four states as having 
made the change between 1965 and 1985).  
 102. See HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 97, § 27.16 (describing the 
landlord’s duty under the doctrine as “very limited”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 355 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (providing that “a lessor of land is not subject 
to liability to . . . others upon the land . . . for physical harm caused by any 
dangerous condition which comes into existence after the lessee has taken 
possession”).  
 103. The most important exceptions to the doctrine included situations in 
which the landlord knew of concealed defects and failed to disclose them, knew 
that the premises would be open to the public, failed to comply with an 
agreement to repair a hazard, or where the injury occurred on common 
premises. See HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 97, § 27.16 (noting that unless 
the landlord’s actions fell into one of the noted exceptions to the open and 
obvious hazard doctrine, he was generally considered not liable for any injury 
incurred due to a lack of due care). 
 104. See id. (describing the law that traditionally provided that “the 
tenant . . . was therefore traditionally considered alone liable to visitors for 
injuries . . . [as] rapidly changing”).  
 105. See id. (stating that under the traditional rule, the tenant of leased 
premises maintains exclusive possession over the property, which excuses the 
landlord from liability toward injured visitors). 
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The third limitation is that historically, land possessors were 
not liable when visitors on land were injured by an “open and 
obvious” hazard.106 If the evidence proved that the risk was open 
and obvious to the reasonable person, the court took the case 
away from the jury and ruled for the defendant as a matter of 
law.107 Many courts have moved away from this position and now 
hold that “the fact that a dangerous condition is open and 
obvious . . . does not pretermit the land possessor’s liability.”108 
Rather, the open and obvious nature of the risk bears upon 
whether the defendant exercised reasonable care, most often a 
question to be decided by the jury.109 
3. Other No-Duty and Limited-Duty Rules 
In innumerable factual situations other than those arising in 
premises liability, courts take cases from juries by holding that 
the defendant owes the plaintiff either no duty of care or a 
limited duty of care.110 They reason that judges, not juries, should 
decide whether a duty is owed because the decision is one resting 
on policy that “will be the same in every case” and not on 
evidence regarding the facts of a particular case.111 Courts vary 
                                                                                                     
 106. See id. § 27.9 (stating that land possessor “owes the licensee no duty of 
precaution if the danger is perfectly obvious”).  
 107. See, e.g., Lorenzo v. Wirth, 49 N.E. 1010, 1011 (Mass. 1898) (ruling that 
a land possessor had no duty to warn licensee of an open coal hole).  
 108. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 51 
cmt. k (AM. LAW INST. 2012). 
 109. See Broussard v. State, 113 So.3d 175, 185 (La. 2013) (“[T]he fact-
finder . . . determines . . . whether those risks pose an open and obvious 
hazard . . . [and] whether defendant has breached a duty . . . by failing to 
discover, obviate, or warn of a defect . . . .”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 51 cmt. k (requiring land possessors “to take 
reasonable precautions for known or obvious dangers when the possessor 
‘should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness’” and 
extending the duty to all entrants except flagrant trespassers (citation 
omitted)). 
 110. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM 
§ 7(b) (“In exceptional cases . . . in a particular class of cases, a court may decide 
that the defendant has no duty or that the ordinary duty of reasonable care 
requires modification.”).  
 111. See id. § 7 cmt. a (“When liability depends on factors applicable to 
categories of actors or patterns of conduct, the appropriate rubric is duty. 
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considerably in the extent to which they are willing to employ the 
“no duty” rubric to prevent cases from reaching the jury.112 
However, the Third Restatement of Torts explicitly admonishes 
courts not to use no-duty analysis excessively: “When 
no . . . categorical considerations apply and reasonable minds 
could differ . . . courts should not use duty and no-duty 
determinations to substitute their evaluation for that of the 
jury.”113 
In considering the effect of no-duty rules on a state’s Jury 
Access Denial Index, we examine three subsets of such rules on 
which virtually all states have taken clear positions, but these 
positions often conflict with one another. First, we consider 
dramshop liability; that is, whether someone who sells 
intoxicating beverages to a third party who then harms someone, 
owes a duty of care to the victim.114 A substantial majority of 
states recognize such liability.115 Among the states that do not 
recognize liability, a few explicitly hold that no duty is owed.116 
However, most courts that hold for the defendant find as a matter 
                                                                                                     
No-duty rules are appropriate only when a court can promulgate relatively 
clear, categorical, bright-line rules of law applicable to a general class of cases.”).  
 112. Compare, e.g., Duvall v. Goldin, 362 N.W.2d 275, 279 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1984) (holding that a physician owed a duty of care to a third party when 
“failure to diagnose or properly treat an epileptic condition may create a risk of 
harm to a third party”), with, e.g., Medina v. Hochberg, 987 N.E.2d 1206, 1213 
(Mass. 2013) (holding that “a physician does not owe a duty to nonpatients to 
warn his or her patients of the dangers of driving posed by a patient’s 
underlying medical condition”). 
 113. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 7 
cmt. i (finding that “[c]ourts sometimes inaptly express this result in terms of 
duty” when “reasonable minds could differ about the application of the 
negligence standard to a particular category of recurring facts”). 
 114. See Dram Shop Civil Liability and Criminal Penalty State Statutes, 
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-
services-and-commerce/dram-shop-liability-state-statutes.aspx (last updated June 
14, 2013) (last visited Apr. 21, 2016) (describing dramshop liability as holding 
liquor sellers “liable for selling or serving alcohol to individuals who cause 
injuries or death as a result of their intoxication”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 115. See id. (listing dramshop liability statutes in thirty states); see also 
infra Appendix A, tbl.2 and accompanying notes (describing the position of the 
courts of each of the seventeen states surveyed in our analysis).  
 116. See, e.g., Warr v. JMGM Grp., LLC, 70 A.3d 347, 364 (Md. 2013) 
(deciding that tavern operator owes no duty to the parent of a child killed by 
patron of tavern). 
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of law that the plaintiff’s harm does not lie within the scope of 
risk created by the defendant’s conduct or that the defendant’s 
actions were not a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury.117 For 
our analysis, this classic distinction does not matter; either 
ground for dismissal prevents the jury from deciding the case.  
The second subcategory of no-duty rules is whether a mental 
health provider owes a duty of care to a person harmed by his 
patient after the therapist has knowledge or should have 
knowledge of the risk posed by his patient.118 The third and final 
subcategory of no-duty rules is whether a state owes a duty of 
care to a person injured or killed by a probationer or parolee 
when state authorities have been negligent in releasing or 
supervising him.119 
4. Limitations on the Liability of Charitable Institutions 
Alongside the transition from contributory negligence, the 
total or partial abrogation of immunities is regarded as one of the 
most important pro-plaintiff changes in tort law during the last 
half of the twentieth century.120 The abrogation of sovereign 
                                                                                                     
 117. See Julia A. Harden, Comment, Dramshop Liability: Should the 
Intoxicated Person Recover for His Own Injuries?, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 227, 230–33, 
233 n.64 (1987) (listing cases from states concluding that “the proximate cause 
of the injury is drinking the liquor, not selling it”).  
 118. Compare Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 341 
(Cal. 1976) (“When a therapist determines . . . that his patient presents a 
serious danger of violence to another, he incurs an obligation to use reasonable 
care to protect the intended victim against such danger.”), with Nasser v. 
Parker, 455 S.E.2d 502, 506 (Va. 1995) (ruling that the defendant therapist had 
no duty to warn murdered plaintiff of danger posed by ex-boyfriend patient who 
had earlier threatened to kill plaintiff); see also infra Appendix A, tbl.2 
(identifying the positions of the courts of each of the seventeen states surveyed 
in our analysis). 
 119. Compare Taggart v. State, 822 P.2d 243, 257 (Wash. 1992) (concluding 
that “parole officers have a duty to protect [third parties] from reasonably 
foreseeable dangers engendered by parolees’ dangerous propensities”), with Fox 
v. Custis, 372 S.E.2d 373, 375–76 (Va. 1974) (finding that the defendant state 
parole officers owed no duty to victims of crimes committed by parolee); see also 
infra Appendix A (detailing the position of the courts of each of the seventeen 
states surveyed in our analysis). 
 120. See SHULMAN ET AL., supra note 61, at 507 (noting that “the trend 
toward total or partial abrogation of . . . immunities during the latter decades of 
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immunity,121 family immunities,122 and charitable immunities123 
enabled more injured victims to have their cases heard by the 
jury. In our analysis, we focus on limitations on the traditional 
immunity of charitable institutions for two reasons. First, 
considerable variations exist regarding the law governing liability 
of charitable institutions, thereby facilitating cross-state 
comparisons.124 Second, the liability of charitable institutions has 
important real-world litigation consequences because of the 
extent to which once-immune defendants such as charitable 
hospitals125 and even religious institutions126 have now become 
important targets of litigation. These changes to charitable 
immunity began earlier in the twentieth century and continued 
into the 1990s, but again they were concentrated during the 
period of the late 1960s through the mid-1980s.127 
                                                                                                     
the twentieth century ranks among the more striking changes in twentieth 
century tort law”). 
 121. See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 8, § 261 (describing change 
from total sovereign immunity to “limited immunities” for governments and 
their officials; further stating that “it is now usually accepted that 
government . . . should be obliged to make good on the losses it causes by 
misconduct”). 
 122. See id. §§ 279–280 (discussing the partial or total elimination of family 
immunities, including interspousal and parental immunities).  
 123. See id. § 282 (covering partial or total elimination of the immunities of 
charitable institutions). 
 124. See infra Part IV.G (explaining that many states have various reasons 
for differences in laws governing charitable institutions and other limiting 
factors, often citing reasons such as stare decisis); see also infra Appendix A, 
tbl.2. 
 125. See Stephen H. Price, The Sinking of the “Captain of the Ship”, 10 J. 
LEGAL MED. 323, 348 (1989) (describing increasing litigation against hospitals in 
the wake of the abrogation of charitable immunity). 
 126. See Scott C. Idleman, Tort Liability, Religious Entities, and the Decline 
of Constitutional Protection, 75 IND. L.J. 219, 240 (2000) (explaining that “actions 
specifically against religious entities and individuals . . . appear to be on the 
rise”). 
 127. See Janet Fairchild, Annotation, Tort Immunity of Nongovernmental 
Charities—Modern Status, 25 A.L.R. 4th 517 (2005) (listing decisions abolishing 
charitable immunity from forty-eight states along with their dates). 
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5. Standards Governing the Qualifications of Scientific Experts 
The legal standard for establishing the qualifications of 
scientific experts in tort cases is often critical to the plaintiff’s 
ability to have her case heard by the jury.128 Medical and 
financial experts have always been important in helping the jury 
assess damages in automobile and other routine tort cases, but 
during the past generation, experts have become increasingly 
important in determining liability in medical malpractice,129 
products liability,130 and toxic tort cases.131 In such cases, if a 
plaintiff lacks an expert the court deems qualified to testify 
regarding causation or other prerequisites for liability, the trial 
judge dismisses the case by granting either a summary judgment 
before trial or a directed verdict during trial, thus preventing the 
submission of the case to the jury.132 
                                                                                                     
 128. See Daniel J. Capra, The Daubert Puzzle, 32 GA. L. REV. 699, 754 (1998) 
(stating that “especially in toxic tort cases, . . . [the] exclusion of an expert on 
admissibility grounds is usually tantamount to a dismissal on insufficiency 
grounds”). 
 129. See David E. Seidelson, Medical Malpractice Cases and the Reluctant 
Expert, 16 CATH. U. L. REV. 158, 162 (1966) (explaining that “in an overwhelming 
majority of malpractice actions expert testimony is the sine qua non of plaintiff’s 
case”). 
 130. See generally DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 6.3 (3d ed. 
2014) (describing the importance of expert testimony in proving defectiveness 
and causation in products liability cases). 
 131. See Leslie A. Lunney, Protecting Juries from Themselves: Restricting 
the Admission of Expert Testimony in Toxic Tort Cases, 48 SMU L. REV. 103, 105 
(1994) (“In toxic tort cases, expert testimony plays a crucial role, because it 
would be difficult for a plaintiff to satisfy his or her burden of proof regarding 
causation without the specialized knowledge and opinion of an expert.”).  
 132. See e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 43 F.3d 1311, 1315 (9th Cir. 
1995), on remand from 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (affirming for a second time the 
district court’s granting of “summary judgment based on its exclusion of 
plaintiffs’ expert testimony”); Am. & Foreign Ins. Co. v. GE, 45 F.3d 135, 136 
(6th Cir. 1995) (affirming “lower court’s decision to exclude portions of the 
expert’s testimony [and] to direct a verdict in favor of [defendant]”); Lessard v. 
Caterpillar Inc., 737 N.Y.S.2d 191 (App. Div. 2002) (holding that “[t]he court 
properly granted defendant’s motion for a directed verdict, given the inability of 
plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of design defect in the absence of expert 
testimony”); Michael A. Haskel, A Proposal for Addressing the Effects of 
Hindsight and Positive Outcome Biases in Medical Malpractice Cases, 42 TORT 
TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 895, 912 (2007) (stating that “if proffered expert 
testimony being relied upon by the plaintiff to establish a prima face case is 
excluded . . . , the plaintiff would be unable to defeat a motion for summary 
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To determine how restrictive states are in qualifying 
scientific experts to testify in tort cases, we measured the extent 
to which states adopted holdings in the 1990s that made it more 
difficult to qualify scientific experts as a response to a perceived 
lack of rigor in screening experts during the 1970s and the 
1980s.133 In 1975, the standard for the admissibility of expert 
testimony in the federal courts moved in a decidedly pro-plaintiff 
direction with the adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 702.134 
Most states soon adopted similar rules.135 Many trial court judges 
saw the new rules as an invitation to allow virtually any 
self-described expert to testify.136  
Reacting against a perceived onslaught of “junk science,”137 
in 1992 the U.S. Supreme Court, in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals,138 interpreted the new federal rule. The Court 
called upon federal judges to assume “a gatekeeping 
role . . . [that] on occasion will prevent the jury from learning of 
                                                                                                     
judgment brought by the defendant”); Georgene M. Vairo, “Through the Prism: 
Summary Judgment After the Triology,” ALI-ABA Course Materials: Civil 
Practice and Litigation Techniques in Federal and State Courts (2005) 
(describing how the tighter standards for the admissibility of scientific evidence 
after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Daubert “often leads to the approval of a 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment”). 
 133. See infra Part II.A.5 (discussing how holdings like Daubert greatly 
restricted the admissibility of expert witnesses). 
 134. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (explaining that expert opinions are admissible as 
long as they meet four qualitative criteria). 
 135. See Heather G. Hamilton, Note, The Movement From Frye to Daubert: 
Where Do the States Stand?, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 201, 209 (1998) (“As of January 
1, 1995, only seven states had not adopted Rule 702.”).  
 136. See, e.g., Chaulk v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 808 F.2d 639, 642, 644 (7th 
Cir. 1986) (Posner, J., dissenting) (criticizing the growing prevalence of expert 
witnesses for fields of knowledge that do not require expert testimony and their 
unreliable testimony).  
 137. See OWEN, supra note 130, § 6.3 (describing how during the 1970s and 
1980s, “courts and commentators . . . increasingly decried a perceived growth in 
abuses of expert testimony—of ‘junk science’ run amok”); see also DEPT. OF JUST., 
REP. OF THE TORT POL’Y WORKING GROUP ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT & POL’Y 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INS. AVAILABILITY & AFFORDABILITY 35 
(1986) (indicating that “noncredible scientific or medical testimony, studies or 
opinions . . . commonly referred to as ‘junk science’ . . . has led to a deep and 
growing cynicism about the ability of tort law to deal with difficult scientific and 
medical concepts in a principled and rational way”).  
 138. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
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authentic insights and innovations.”139 Federal trial judges were 
told to “make a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning 
or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid 
and . . . can be applied to the facts in issue.”140 In making these 
determinations, courts were to consider whether the expert’s 
theory or technique had been tested, the reliability of a procedure 
and its potential rate of error, whether the technique had been 
subjected to peer evaluation and published, and whether it was 
generally accepted in the scientific community.141  
A majority of states proceeded to adopt the Daubert standard 
for the admissibility of expert testimony or some variant of it, 
while a minority continued to follow142 some variant of the 
standard established in Frye v. United States.143 The Frye test for 
admissibility is whether a newly developed form of science or 
technology is “sufficiently established to have gained general 
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.”144  
Despite hints in the Daubert opinion itself that the Supreme 
Court intended to liberalize the admission of scientific 
testimony,145 by 2005, Professors Edward Cheng and Albert Yoon 
concluded that in the federal courts:  
                                                                                                     
 139. Id. at 597.  
 140. Id. at 592–93. 
 141. See id. at 593–94 (noting that the Court did not “presume to set out a 
definitive checklist or test”). In its subsequent opinion in General Electric Co. v. 
Joiner, the Court further strengthened the trial court’s gate-keeping function 
when it held that appellate courts would review trial court decisions only under 
the comparatively lax “abuse of discretion” standard. See 522 U.S. 136, 145 
(1997) (“We hold, therefore, that abuse of discretion is the proper standard by 
which to review a district court’s decision to admit or exclude scientific 
evidence.”). 
 142. See OWEN, supra note 130, at n.82 (“As of 2002, roughly fifteen states 
still purport to follow Frye.”).  
 143. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. 1923).  
 144. Id. at 1014.  
 145. The Court described Frye as establishing an “austere standard” and 
emphasized that its new standard was “a flexible one.” Id. at 594. It also 
emphasized that “‘[g]eneral acceptance’ is not a necessary precondition to the 
admissibility of scientific evidence.” Id. at 597; see also Joiner, 522 U.S. at 142 
(following Daubert and observing that “the Federal Rules of Evidence allow 
district courts to admit a somewhat broader range of scientific testimony than 
would have been admissible under Frye”).  
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Daubert has become a potent weapon of tort reform by causing 
judges to scrutinize scientific evidence more closely. . . . The 
resulting effects of Daubert have been decidedly pro-
defendant. In the civil context, Daubert has empowered 
defendants to exclude certain types of scientific evidence, 
substantially improving their chances of obtaining summary 
judgment and thereby avoiding what are perceived to be 
unpredictable and often plaintiff-friendly juries.146 
Most other observers agree that Daubert is more restrictive than 
Frye in allowing an expert’s testimony to be heard by the jury.147 
In other words, the adoption of the Daubert standard by most 
state courts in the early 1990s is yet another means of denying 
plaintiffs access to juries.  
In Table 2 in Appendix A, we briefly identify each of the 
seventeen states’ respective positions on the issues described in 
this Subpart.148  
                                                                                                     
 146. Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A 
Study of Scientific Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471, 472–73 (2005) 
(footnote omitted). However, the authors attempted to indirectly “measure the 
effect of Frye versus Daubert” by comparing the rates at which tort defendants 
sought to remove their cases from New York courts (continuing to follow Frye) to 
federal courts (following Daubert) with the rates that similar defendants in 
Connecticut (following Daubert) removed to federal courts. Id. at 482, 485. They 
found “that a state’s choice of scientific admissibility standard does not have a 
statistically significant effect on removal rates.” Id. at 503. They concluded that 
“[t]his finding may support the broader theory that a state’s adoption of Frye or 
Daubert makes no difference in practice.” Id. 
 147. Professor Lucinda Finley writes:  
Those who predicted that trial judges would flex their gatekeeper 
muscles to exclude vast quantities of plaintiffs’ proposed expert 
causation opinion testimony in products liability cases have turned 
out to be right. The post-Daubert era can fairly be described as the 
period of “strict scrutiny” of science by non-scientifically trained 
judges. 
Lucinda M. Finley, Guarding the Gate to the Courthouse: How Trial Judges Are 
Using Their Evidentiary Screening Role to Remake Tort Causation Rules, 49 
DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 341 (2000); see also, e.g., Joseph Sanders, Shari S. Diamond 
& Neil Vidmar, Legal Perceptions of Science and Expert Knowledge, 8 PSYCHOL., 
PUB. POL’Y & L. 139, 141 n.13 (2002) (concluding that “in practice the Daubert 
test has been more restrictive than Frye”). 
 148. Infra Appendix A, tbl.2. 
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III. Possible Explanations for Variations in Tort Law Affecting 
Jury Access 
In this Part, we discuss the factors that we identify as the 
ones most likely to affect the extent to which a state continues to 
follow the substantive law doctrines that once denied personal 
injury plaintiffs access to the jury in almost all jurisdictions but 
continue to be followed in only a minority of states. In Part IV, we 
empirically test whether there is a correlation between any of 
these variables and the extent to which a state continues to 
employ these jury-access-denial doctrines.149  
In Subpart A of this Part, we discuss whether perceptions 
among judges and legislators that predominantly 
African-American and low-income urban juries will be biased in 
favor of personal injury plaintiffs results in policymakers 
adopting doctrines that deny plaintiffs access to juries.150 In 
Subpart B, we consider whether a state’s history as part of the 
South affects the extent to which it has adopted changes to its 
substantive law that have helped personal injury plaintiffs to 
have their cases decided by the jury.151 We initially examined this 
factor because we recognized that tort law in the South more 
often appears to impede the plaintiff’s access to the jury than 
does the substantive law in other states.152 As but one example, 
we noted that all five jurisdictions that retain contributory 
negligence as a total bar to the plaintiff’s recovery lie below the 
Mason–Dixon Line.153 Finally, in Subpart C, we consider a 
possible alternative explanation for why some states continue to 
follow anti-jury doctrines more than others, namely, that 
politically liberal states might be expected to be more flexible in 
                                                                                                     
 149. Infra Part IV. 
 150. Because previous research on the effects of these two separate and 
distinct variables often considers them together, we consider both race and 
income inequality in Part A. However, our own empirical testing considers each 
individually, see infra Part IV.C (income inequality) & Part IV.D (race), before 
testing for interactions among the variables. Infra Part IV.F.  
 151. Infra Part III.B. 
 152. Infra Appendix A, tbl.1. 
 153. See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 8, § 220 (noting that 
Alabama, the District of Columbia, Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia are 
the last remaining jurisdictions to retain contributory negligence); see also infra 
Appendix A, tbl.2 (listing the JADI assessments).  
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allowing personal injury plaintiffs to have their cases decided by 
juries.154 
We recognize that in any particular state, idiosyncratic 
factors, such as the presence of an unusually effective tort reform 
lobbyist, can affect the extent to which that state denies jury 
access.155 Moreover, while we cannot exclude the possibility of 
correlations with other variables for which we do not test, 156 our 
review of the existing literature, as well as our own 
                                                                                                     
 154. Infra Part III.C. 
 155. Shortly after William Prosser advocated for a comparative negligence 
bill in the California legislature in 1953, in a letter to his mother he described 
the efforts of insurance and industry lobbyists that caused the bill to fail:  
The association [the California State Bar Association] was quite 
confident that it would get the bill through. There were eleven votes 
on the senate committee, and they thought they had seven of them 
nailed down, with hopes of an eighth. In the meantime, however, a 
defendants’ lobby, manned and financed by the liability insurance 
companies and the railroads, had moved in to kill the bill. I was told 
by one friendly member of the assembly committee that it was the 
heaviest drive that any lobby had put on in the last four years, with 
more money spent on entertaining the members of the committees 
and the like, than anyone remembered for quite a while. In addition 
there were phone calls and telegrams from people over the state, 
mostly good clients of the legislators—the bill came before the 
judiciary committee, all of whom are lawyers. The result was that the 
vote went 6 to 5 against the bill in the senate committee. . . . It is 
licked for this session. I am getting pretty well acquainted with the 
committees, and also getting a liberal education on how we are 
governed. 
Letter from William L. Prosser to Zerelda Ann Huckeby Prosser (May 3, 1953) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). We express our thanks to 
Professor Christopher J. Robinette for providing us with access to the letter. See 
also Gifford & Robinette, supra note 89, at 702 (describing efforts of lobbyists 
representing business and insurance interests to prevent enactment of 
comparative fault legislation). 
 156. A few of the variables that might be tested for correlation with a state’s 
Jury Access Denial Index include (a) the rate of unionization between 1965 and 
1985; (b) the prevalence of various types of businesses within a state; 
(c) whether appellate judges are elected or appointed; and (d) the percentage of 
African-American voters disenfranchised in 1965. We considered studying a 
correlation between the date when an African-American justice joined each 
state’s supreme court and the state’s JADI. However, a quick perusal of data 
suggested no association. See First Black Judges on the State Supreme Courts, 
BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/First_black_judges_on_the_state_supreme_ 
courts (last visited Mar. 7, 2016) (providing a history of African-American judges 
on state supreme courts) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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understanding of tort law, informed the selection of the variables 
we tested. 
A. Race and Income Inequality: The Perception that “Bronx 
Juries” Redistribute Wealth 
1. The Legal Community’s Perceptions of African-American and 
Low-Income Jurors 
Judges and lawyers typically believe that the racial and 
socio-economic composition of the jury affects trial outcomes.157 
That being the case, we hypothesize that judges and legislators of 
states where the leading and most visible legal centers include a 
high percentage of African-American or low-income jurors may 
continue to follow the traditional tort doctrines that impede the 
ability of tort plaintiffs to have their cases “reach” (be considered 
by) juries. It is the widely held perceptions among judges and 
legislators regarding the decision-making of African-American 
and low-income jurors—and not actual differences between trial 
outcomes at the hands of disproportionately poor and 
African-American urban juries and those elsewhere—that lead to 
more restrictions on jury access.  
Professors Marvin Zalman and Olga Tsoudis interviewed 
seventy-nine attorneys following trials in which they participated 
regarding what juror characteristics they looked for during the 
voir dire process.158 They found that the attorneys believed “that 
blacks are more sympathetic to civil plaintiffs because they are 
more often subject to unfairness.”159 One plaintiff’s attorney 
acknowledged his biases during voir dire: “‘Do I look at race?—
yes—absolutely. . . . Women and blacks—those people have been 
                                                                                                     
 157. See, e.g., infra note 160 and accompanying text (reporting a study that 
found that attorneys have attempted to structure the jury to include jurors who 
have traditionally been discriminated against). 
 158. See Marvin Zalman & Olga Tsoudis, Plucking Weeds from the Garden: 
Lawyers Speak About Voir Dire, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 163, 187–88 (2005) (noting 
that the questions asked were both “narrowly focused and open ended”). 
 159. Id. at 304.  
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hammered all their lives.’”160 Another study found that defense 
attorneys use peremptory challenges to exclude twice as many 
potential black jurors as do plaintiffs’ attorneys.161 
The intuition that African-American and poor jurors will 
favor plaintiffs when they decide the issue of liability and when 
they assess damages is a logical one given the experiences of 
dispossessed groups in American society. Frank McClellan, an 
African-American scholar and plaintiff’s attorney, writes that 
“[e]xpressing their perceptions of justice through awards in 
serious personal injury cases is one of the few opportunities that 
most people of color have to . . . send a message to corporations 
and other powerful social players.”162 In a similar vein, Eric 
Helland and Alexander Tabarrok conclude their analysis of the 
effects of race and poverty on damages awards by hypothesizing: 
“Given the different life experiences of poor black and Hispanic 
jury members, . . . the decisions of such jurors about 
justice . . . could differ significantly from those of other jurors.”163 
From one perspective, the distinctive predilections of 
African-American and low-income jurors as they approach the 
liability issue can be seen as a concrete and legitimate 
manifestation of the jury’s role in reflecting community values.164 
From the other perspective, corporate officials and defense 
                                                                                                     
 160. Id. Another plaintiff’s attorney participating in the study observed that 
“African-Americans . . . are more generous in damage awards. They tend to 
support the underdog.” Id. 
 161. See John Clark et al., Five Factor Model Personality Traits, Jury 
Selection, and Case Outcomes in Criminal and Civil Cases, 34 CRIM. JUST. & 
BEHAV. 641, 647 tbl.1 (2007) (finding that 24% of the jurors excused by defense 
attorneys in civil cases were African-American, compared with 12% of the jurors 
excused by plaintiffs’ attorneys). For more on the use of peremptory challenges 
to exclude African-American jurors specifically in the South, see infra notes 
220−228 and accompanying text.  
 162. McClellan, supra note 2, at 785.  
 163. Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, Race, Poverty, and American Tort 
Awards: Evidence in Three Data Sets, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 27, 52 (2003). 
 164. See Jason M. Solomon, The Political Puzzle of the Civil Jury, 61 EMORY 
L.J. 1331, 1382 (2012) (characterizing the jury award as “a way that the 
community sends a message about how bad the wrong or injury is” and opining 
that “this is an important part of helping constitute a community—meting out 
justice . . . [as] a way of articulating a community’s values”).  
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counsel fear that African-American and low-income jurors may 
seek to retaliate for past or present grievances.165  
Judges and legislators also fear that urban juries containing 
significant numbers of African-American and low-income jurors 
are predisposed to render larger damage awards. Professor 
McClellan describes the urban jury as a rare opportunity for 
dispossessed jurors “to make an immediate economic impact in 
favor of an injured member of the community.”166 A New York 
defense attorney put it more pejoratively when he stated that 
“‘[t]he Bronx civil jury is the greatest tool of wealth redistribution 
since the Red Army.’”167 In fact, the evidence regarding whether 
juries with greater numbers of African-Americans and the poor 
award higher damages than their whiter and more affluent 
counterparts is inconclusive.168 At the same time, however, many 
judges and legislators assume that the stronger sensitivity of 
African-American and low-income jurors to injustice and their 
often less-than-positive encounters with businesses and 
professionals lead them to award higher damages to personal 
injury victims, regardless of the victim’s race or socioeconomic 
status.169  
2. Comparing the Impact of Race on Welfare Reform 
It does not appear that any scholar has previously examined 
the impact that the racial attitudes of judges or legislators have 
on the development of tort law, or even whether there is an 
association between racial demographics and the substance of a 
                                                                                                     
 165. See, e.g., id. at 1340 (discussing the civil jury’s role as a check on 
corporate and government power). 
 166. McClellan, supra note 2, at 785.  
 167. Noeleen Walder, Strauss-Kahn Accuser May Sue in Friendly Bronx, 
REUTERS (Aug. 4, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/04/us-
strausskahn-civilsuit-bronx-idUSTRE77379D20110804 (last visited Mar. 7, 
2016) (on file with the Washington and lee Law Review). 
 168. See infra notes 184–185 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of 
a population’s racial composition on a plaintiff’s success). 
 169. See, e.g., Valerie P. Hans, What’s It Worth? Jury Damage Awards as 
Community Judgments, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 935, 955 (2014) (arguing that 
corporations should be held to higher levels of responsibility than individuals 
and should thus be required to pay a greater amount of damages). 
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state’s tort law.170 However, during the era when most states 
moved toward greater jury access for injured plaintiffs, scholars 
and courts frequently saw victim compensation or loss 
distribution as a central goal of tort law.171 As such, tort law was 
increasingly seen as a close cousin of other more traditional forms 
of state welfare.172 Tort law compensated one particular group of 
those in need, victims of tortious conduct; at the same time, the 
states’ social welfare programs financially assisted other 
residents in need, including victims of injury and disease, 
disability, or old age.173  
Even though many tort scholars now believe that the 
justification for the tort system lies in achieving goals of 
                                                                                                     
 170. A handful of studies consider the impact of race on individual tort 
cases. See, e.g., AUDREY CHIN & MARK A. PETERSON, DEEP POCKETS, EMPTY 
POCKETS: WHO WINS IN COOK COUNTY JURY TRIALS 29, 30 fig.3.2 (1985) (listing, 
by race, awards for plaintiffs and penalties against defendants). Professor 
McClellan has speculated on the ways in which race affects tort cases. See 
McClellan, supra note 2, at 772 (hypothesizing “that the race problem impacts 
on every aspect of a tort claim”). He recognizes the importance of the allocation 
of power between judges and juries: “Enhancing the power of the judiciary in 
tort cases and minimizing the power of the jury represent a tremendous shift in 
political power, a shift which should not be taken lightly.” Id. at 790. Ultimately, 
Professor McClellan calls for the kind of empirical analysis that we present: 
“One issue which warrants study is whether people of color will be adversely 
affected if tort reform allocates more power to judges and less power to juries. In 
communities that are racially diverse, the answer is most likely yes.” Id. at 792. 
 171. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 27–28 (1970) (describing the importance of spreading 
accident losses and shifting them to “deep pockets” as a means of reducing “the 
real societal costs of accidents”).  
 172. See, e.g., Matthew Diller, Tort and Social Welfare Principles in the 
Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 719, 725–26 (2003) (observing 
that “[t]he tort and social welfare systems both serve to protect people from 
harm through the provision of financial payments after a harm has occurred” 
and noting that “in the context of mass tort litigation, the tort system 
increasingly draws on social welfare principles”); Donald G. Gifford, The Death 
of Causation: Mass Products Torts’ Incomplete Incorporation of Social Welfare 
Principles, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 943, 952–81 (2006) (tracing the origins of 
the loss distribution objective in American tort law to workers’ compensation 
legislation and even further back to German and English social welfare 
legislation).  
 173. See Gifford, supra note 172, at 951 (noting that the United States did 
not enact welfare systems comparable to those of Germany and England until 
the 1930s). 
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“corrective justice” or “civil recourse,”174 critics continue to 
characterize it as a means of loss distribution. For example, when 
later-President George W. Bush ran for Governor of Texas in 
1994, his “four-issue strategy” included both welfare reform and 
tort reform.175 As Professor Philip G. Peters, Jr. observed, for 
voters “seeking to reinvigorate ‘traditional’ social values, . . . tort 
reform may closely resemble welfare reform, each ending an era 
of unearned giveaways.”176 
Insofar as the tort system is viewed as a parallel to a state’s 
social welfare policy, as it often was during the last decades of the 
twentieth century, extensive research by social scientists on how 
a state’s racial demographics affected its welfare reform 
initiatives during that period177 may shed light on how those 
demographics impacted the development of tort law during the 
same period of time. The research finds that states with higher 
percentages of African-Americans on government assistance offer 
lower benefits than other states, even when the analysis is 
controlled for other economic and demographic factors,178 as well 
                                                                                                     
 174. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort Law and 
Moral Luck, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1123, 1138 (2007) (characterizing tort law as “a 
law of wrongs and redress”).  
 175. See Anne E. Kornblut, Revisiting ’00 Part of Strategy for Bush in ’04, 
BOS. GLOBE (May 23, 2004), http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2004 
/05/23/revisiting_00_part_of_strategy_for_bush_in_04/?page=ful (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2016) (noting that the other two issues were education and crime 
reform) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 176. Philip G. Peters, Jr., Doctors & Juries, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1453, 1485–86 
(2007).  
 177. See generally RACE AND THE POLITICS OF WELFARE REFORM (Sanford F. 
Schram, Joe Soss & Richard C. Fording eds., 2003) (collecting studies discussing 
the relationship between race and welfare reform).  
 178. See, e.g., Richard C. Fording, “Laboratories of Democracy” or Symbolic 
Politics?: The Racial Origins of Welfare Reform, in RACE AND THE POLITICS OF 
WELFARE REFORM, supra note 177, at 78, 93 (reporting that “race is an 
important factor in welfare policy-making” and that “the percentage of the 
AFDC caseload that is black proves to be the strongest and most consistent 
predictor of the adoption of work requirements, time limits, and state efforts to 
regulate ‘irresponsible’ behavior” (emphasis in the original)); Harrell R. Rodgers, 
Jr. & Kent L. Tedin, State TANF Spending: Predictors of State Tax Effort to 
Support Welfare Reform, 23 REV. POL’Y RES. 745, 758 (2006) (“[O]ur analysis 
reveals that states with larger black populations tend to keep [welfare] spending 
low.”).  
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as for ideological and partisan variables.179 Other studies have 
found that the larger the percentage of African-Americans in a 
state’s population, the smaller the welfare benefits.180  
Dr. Martin Johnson attributes the impact of racial 
demographics on welfare reform to the threat posed by 
African-Americans to the power structure controlled by the white 
population:  
In the contemporary South . . . larger minority populations 
appear to be associated with antiminority hostility and less 
desirable policies for those minorities, such as stricter voter 
registration laws. Further, these feelings of threat appear to 
be exacerbated by economics: as economic conditions in a 
community worsen, members of the racial or ethnic majority 
grow less supportive or tolerant of the minority due to their 
financial insecurity.181 
                                                                                                     
 179. See, e.g., Robert D. Brown, Party Cleavages and Welfare Effort in the 
American States, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 23, 30 (1995) (noting that “[a]s the black 
portion of the state population increases, welfare effort is diminished” even 
when controlling for “party elite liberalism and the nature of party cleavages”); 
Christopher Howard, The American Welfare State, or States?, 52 POL. RES. Q. 
421, 437 (1999) (noting that Democratic Party strength did not have an effect on 
AFDC benefits).  
 180. See, e.g., MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA, 
AND THE POLITICS OF ANTIPOVERTY POLICY 176 (1999) (finding that studies “that 
have included some measure of the racial mix of a state’s poverty population 
have consistently found race to be a significant influence on state-level AFDC 
policy”); Martin Johnson, Racial Context, Public Attitudes, and Welfare Effort in 
the American States, in RACE AND THE POLITICS OF WELFARE REFORM, supra note 
177, at 161 (“A one-standard-deviation increase in a state’s African American 
population is associated with a decrease in welfare spending by about one-fifth 
of a standard deviation.”); Brown, supra note 179, at 30 (noting that “[a]s the 
black portion of the state population increases, welfare effort is diminished”); 
Gerald C. Wright, Jr., Racism and Welfare Policy in America, 57 SOC. SCI. Q. 
718, 726 tbl.3 (1977) (“For the hypothesis concerning the effects of racial 
variables we find supporting evidence with high negative correlations of AFDC 
payments with percent black . . . .”).  
 181. See also Johnson, supra note 180, at 153 (“[T]he total effect of increased 
diversity on racial attitudes is a reduction of support among whites for racial 
integration, consistent with the group threat hypothesis.”); James M. Glaser, 
Back to the Black Belt: Racial Environment and White Racial Attitudes in the 
South, 56 J. POL. 21, 40 (1994) (concluding that “[r]esistance to racial 
change . . . is a response to the possibility that whites stand to lose something 
valued to blacks”); Ryan D. King & Darren Wheelock, Group Threat and Social 
Control: Race, Perceptions of Minorities and the Desire to Punish, 85 SOC. 
FORCES 1255, 1274 (2007) (concluding that “perceptions of African Americans as 
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This “group threat” hypothesis possibly has even stronger 
implications for how whites perceive the presence of large 
numbers of African-Americans within the population from which 
members of juries are drawn in civil cases. The substantial 
presence of African-American jurors, believed to be more prone to 
redistribute wealth in cases in which the resources of businesses 
or insurance companies are at stake, poses what they believe to 
be a genuine threat to the economic well-being of the power 
structure. 
3. The Actual Impact of African-American and Low-Income 
Jurors 
In spite of the widely held beliefs that low-income and 
African-American urban juries reach different decisions from 
juries in suburban and rural areas, the evidence is far less 
conclusive than most practitioners, judges, legislators, and 
members of the public believe. Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Professor 
of law and sociology at Yale, found no statistically significant 
correlation between the chance of prevailing on the liability issue 
and any of the following three variables: the income inequality of 
the local population from which the jury is drawn, the percentage 
of the population living below the poverty line, and the 
percentage of persons of color.182 However, her study showed that 
                                                                                                     
threatening to economic resources [is] a salient predictor that helps explain why 
demographic change influences punitive beliefs”).  
 182. See Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Community Characteristics and Tort Law: 
The Importance of County Demographic Composition and Inequality to Tort 
Trial Outcomes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 413, 435 (2011) (discussing data 
showing the effects of various racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic statuses in the 
makeup of juries); see also Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Judgments 
About Liability and Damages: Sources of Variability and Ways to Increase 
Consistency, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 301, 306 (1999) (finding that jurors of color are 
more likely to find for the plaintiff than white jurors, but cautioning that the 
variables of race, education, and income are significantly inter-correlated). But 
see Brian H. Bornstein & Michelle Rajki, Extra-Legal Factors and Product 
Liability: The Influence of Mock Jurors’ Demographic Characteristics and 
Intuitions About the Cause of an Injury, 12 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 127, 143 (1994) 
(finding that minority mock jurors were significantly more likely to favor 
plaintiffs in a product liability case than white jurors); Theodore Eisenberg & 
Martin T. Wells, Trial Outcomes and Demographics: Is There a Bronx Effect?, 80 
TEX. L. REV. 1839, 1853 (2002) (finding that higher county poverty rates were 
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a county’s poverty rate and level of income inequality are 
associated with the amounts of damage awards, but that the 
racial composition of the local population is not.183  
Other studies find that the racial compositions of populations 
from which juries are drawn correlate with neither a greater 
likelihood of the plaintiff prevailing nor larger damage awards. 
As Theodore Eisenberg and Martin Wells bluntly concluded: “In 
tort cases, jury trial awards and plaintiff success rates do not 
consistently increase significantly with black population 
percentage.”184 Interestingly, however, Helland and Tabarrok 
found that race and poverty interact synergistically to increase 
the size of jury awards: “Awards increase dramatically with black 
poverty rates.”185 
Our objective is not to choose sides in this debate, mostly 
between judges and practitioners on one side and scholars on the 
other,186 as to whether the racial or socioeconomic characteristics 
                                                                                                     
correlated with increased likelihood of liability verdicts in tort claims in state 
courts, but not in federal courts); Mary R. Rose & Neil Vidmar, The Bronx 
“Bronx Jury”: A Profile of Civil Jury Awards in New York Counties, 80 TEX. L. 
REV. 1889, 1896 (2002) (showing that plaintiffs had a greater chance of success 
in product liability and medical malpractice cases in Bronx County than in more 
affluent adjoining New York state counties). 
 183. Compare Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 182, at 435 (noting that 
“neither blacks nor Hispanic population rates emerge as statistically significant 
predictors of the level of damages awarded to a plaintiff”), with Helland & 
Tabarrok, supra note 163, at 34 (finding that “[t]he data show[ed] a marked 
increase in award by poverty rate”); see also Geressy v. Dig. Equip. Corp., 980 F. 
Supp. 640, 656–57 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (Weinstein, J.) (noting that “‘[i]t is curious 
that awards for pain and suffering on one side of the East River are uniformly 
two and three times higher than on the other’” (quoting Baumgarten v. Slavin, 
No. 9018/84, slip op. at 3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 6, 1997))), aff’d in part sub nom. 
Madden v. Dig. Equip. Corp., 152 F.3d 919 (2d Cir. 1998).  
 184. Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 182, at 1869; see also Diamond et al., 
supra note 182, at 303–06 (concluding that the correlation between race and 
verdict is inconclusive because of interactions with education and income levels). 
But cf. Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 182, at 1843 (reporting that “[a]ccurately 
or inaccurately, rightly or wrongly, lawyers rely on stereotypical views about 
jurors and counties in assessing cases and the reactions of prospective juries”). 
 185. See Helland & Tabarrok, supra note 163, at 46, 52 (“[A] 
1-percentage-point increase in black poverty rates increases awards by 
approximately 3–10 percent on average . . . . [F]orum shopping or careful voir 
dire could raise awards by 30–100 percent . . . . [Awards] also appear to increase 
with Hispanic poverty rates . . . .”).  
 186. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: 
Transcending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1126 (1992) (“It is helpful 
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of the juror population affect trial outcomes. Instead, our 
hypothesis is that the perceptions of judges and legislators that 
juries with higher percentages of African-American or low-income 
jurors in a state’s largest cities will lead them to continue to 
follow traditional tort doctrines that keep plaintiffs from reaching 
juries. 
B. Keeping Cases from African-American Juries in the Post-Civil 
Rights-Era South: The Impact of Regional History 
Twenty-first century social scientists acknowledge “the 
ongoing distinctiveness of the South . . . even as the economic and 
cultural integration of the region has eroded many of these 
differences.”187 We define “the South” as that part of the country 
where slaveholding was legal and prevalent in 1860 and where de 
jure segregation was frequently practiced at least until the 
1950s.188 The traditional role of race in Southern life plays a 
primary part in this distinctiveness,189 but does not totally 
explain the differences.  
                                                                                                     
to separate two sources of opinions about differences between judge and jury 
trials. Lay and professional perceptions about jury behavior are one source. 
Recent insights of scholars supply the other.”). 
 187. Dan T. Carter, More Than Race: Conservatism in the White South Since 
V.O. Key Jr., in UNLOCKING V.O. KEY JR.: “SOUTHERN POLITICS” FOR THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 129, 149 (Angie Maxwell & Todd G. Shields eds., 2011); see also 
EARL BLACK & MERLE BLACK, POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN THE SOUTH vii (1987) 
(“Although the South has experienced tremendous change in recent decades, it 
remains the most distinctive American region.”).  
 188. The states that we regard as part of the South are identical to those 
identified by a leading book covering the history of the South during the last 
century. Preface to THE AMERICAN SOUTH IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY ix (Craig S. 
Pascoe, Karen Trahan Leathem & Andy Ambrose eds., 2005). Dr. Pascoe and his 
co-editors reason:  
For the purpose of visualizing the South as a distinct region, the 
editors . . . consider the eleven states that seceded from the Union—
Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. Other 
border or nearby states, such as Missouri, Kentucky, Oklahoma, 
Maryland, and West Virginia, should also be included insofar as they 
are affected by the [same] specific forces and shaping influences . . . . 
Id. at xiv.  
 189. See infra notes 207−238 and accompanying text (analyzing the racial 
differences between juries in Northern and Southern states historically).  
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1. Regional Differences in Mid-Nineteenth Century Common Law 
The South’s distinctive development of the common law 
governing personal injuries began as early as the mid-nineteenth 
century, a time when the South’s racial caste system played a 
dominant role in structuring the law. According to Professor 
Howard Schweber, Northern judges during this period threw out 
the highly specific categories and rules embedded in the 
property-based English writ system and replaced them with 
broadly stated negligence principles more favorable to the 
development of railroad technology.190 During the same period, 
argues Professor Schweber, Southern courts were not yet 
confronting the new wave of injuries caused by railroads.191 
Instead, their common law continued for several decades to focus 
on specific rights and obligations arising from the classification of 
different groups of people, which was designed to perpetuate the 
slaveholding and largely agrarian economy.192 Professor 
Schweber concludes that even by the 1870s, when Southern 
courts began to adopt general negligence principles from their 
Northern counterparts, “[t]he fundamental ideological elements 
of antebellum southern legal thought remained the same,” 
including “preservation of . . . traditional English common law 
categories.”193 Because the common law is based on precedent, 
these mid-nineteenth century differences between the North and 
South, with their origins in the South’s slaveholding plantation 
economy, may still affect the extent to which a state’s common 
                                                                                                     
 190. See HOWARD SCHWEBER, THE CREATION OF AMERICAN COMMON LAW, 
1850–1880: TECHNOLOGY, POLITICS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF CITIZENSHIP 80, 
146 (2004) (arguing that the changes in the common law “signaled the complete 
jettisoning of the old, property rights-based analysis of duties” and that “[the 
new common law of the North] was . . . defined in terms of a common duty to 
further technological progress”); see also generally id. at 63–146 (covering cases 
involving property damage and injuries to persons, and providing a comparison 
to Northern states).  
 191. See id. at 147, 157–59 (observing that “Virginia was dominated by an 
established set of interests opposed to the transformative power or railroad 
expansion” and describing the comparatively slow development of railroads in 
the state). 
 192. See id. at 147–258 (discussing, among other topics, an in-depth 
coverage of Virginia history).  
 193. Id. at 204.  
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law is rule-based. Specific, rather than general, legal rules194 are 
more likely to operate in the South today, thus making it more 
difficult for a plaintiff to have her case decided by a jury in the 
South than elsewhere in the country. 
2. The Emergence of Pro-Business Southern Politics 
In his classic 1950 analysis of the political structure of the 
South, V.O. Key, Jr. contended that the South was dominated by 
conservative white elites in areas where African-Americans 
represented a substantial portion of the population.195 These 
elites feared a coalition of African-Americans, who constituted a 
majority in many “black belt”196 areas of the South, and less 
affluent whites who had been heavily influenced by populism and 
were perceived as a threat by large property owners.197 To 
maintain political control, these elite property owners 
exacerbated racial tensions among whites fearful of black rule in 
order to divide those who otherwise might be allied by populist 
economic interests.198  
                                                                                                     
 194. See supra notes 93−118 and accompanying text (identifying no-duty 
and limited duty rules); see also Appendix A, tbl.2 and accompanying notes 
(cataloging the often continuing acceptance of these doctrines by Southern 
states).  
 195. See V.O. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION 5–6 (1950) 
(noting that whites preferentially shaped Southern politics to maintain their 
rule in “black belts”). 
 196. See id. at 5 (describing “the southern black belts” as “those counties and 
sections of the southern states where [African-Americans] constitute a 
substantial proportion of the population”).  
 197. See id. at 6 (noting that black belt whites clashed with the populist 
uprisings of the 1890s); see also GERALD H. GAITHER, BLACKS AND THE POPULIST 
MOVEMENT: BALLOTS AND BIGOTRY IN THE NEW SOUTH (rev. ed. 2005) (describing 
how “[t]he racial prejudices of the poor whites were courted . . . to divest them of 
any thought of organizing around any ideology except white supremacy. Race 
was expected to be a stronger deterrent than any proposed class coalition based 
on economics”).  
 198. See KEY, supra note 195, at 8 (“Everywhere the plantation counties 
were most intense in their opposition to Negro voting; they raised a deafening 
hue and cry about the dangers to white supremacy implicit in a Negro balance of 
power.”); see also id. at 652, 655 (contending that in areas that were majority 
African-American, “whites feared the possibility of Negro control of city, county, 
and other local governments”).  
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During the first half of the twentieth century, the largely 
agrarian property owners in these black belt areas found that 
their economic interests overlapped with those of the business 
community.199 By the 1960s, the South began to vigorously 
recruit businesses from other parts of the country,200 and the 
owners and managers of the newly relocated businesses found 
economic and political allies in the preexisting Southern 
aristocracy.201 Further, middle-class white voters, often driven by 
conservative religious beliefs202 or by their perceptions that 
liberal Democrats favored doing too much for African-Americans, 
enthusiastically joined this conservative coalition.203 As a result, 
the once solid Democratic South now favors the Republican 
                                                                                                     
 199. See id. at 553 (finding that as early as the 1890s, “[t]he planter found 
new allies in the growing industrial and financial classes”); GAITHER, supra note 
197, at 181 (describing how “[a]s a result of . . . racial cleavages developed or 
exacerbated . . . [in Louisiana], blacks and not the Bourbons had become the 
common enemy”). 
 200. See David L. Carlton, Smokestack-Chasing and Its Discontents: 
Southern Development Strategy in the Twentieth Century, in THE AMERICAN 
SOUTH IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, supra note 188, at 122 (“The strategy of 
‘smokestack chasing’—drawing in outside entrepreneurs . . . has done much to 
transform the region, especially in the years since World War II.”). 
 201. See BLACK & BLACK, supra note 187, at 48, 314 (finding that “[a]s the 
twentieth century has proceeded, state power structures have been augmented 
by new producers of wealth emerging from industrialization” and “the mass 
base of many southern Republican parties consist of transplanted Yankees and 
Midwesterners”).  
 202. See id. at 213 (observing that “[i]ndividual responsibility is a major 
theme in southern Protestant culture . . . one that few natives could have 
escaped in childhood” and “‘Ask God for help in your work,’ goes a Protestant 
prayer, but ‘do not ask Him to do it for you’”). 
 203. See Larry M. Bartels, What’s the Matter with What’s the Matter with 
Kansas?, 1 Q.J. POL. SCI. 201, 211 (2006) (reviewing THOMAS FRANK, WHAT’S THE 
MATTER WITH KANSAS? (2000)) (“The overall decline in Democratic support 
among voters in [the] white working class over the past half-century is entirely 
attributable to the demise of the Solid South as a bastion of Democratic 
allegiance.”). Bartels also argues that “dramatic action on civil rights issues by 
national Democratic leaders in the early 1960s precipitated a momentous 
electoral shift among white southerners, eventually replacing [a] . . . Democratic 
majority with a . . . Republican majority.” Id.; see also Alexander P. Lamis, The 
Emergence of a Two-Party System, in THE AMERICAN SOUTH IN THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY, supra note 188, at 225, 229 (explaining that because integrationist 
efforts by Democratic leaders led to the collapse of the one-party Democratic 
South, “[t]he Republican Party’s growth was propelled in these early years 
by . . . white southern resentment against the Kennedy-Johnson-Humphrey 
national Democratic integrationists”).  
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Party.204 This new coalition that emerged simultaneously with 
the transformation of tort law elsewhere in the country is 
committed to checking pro-plaintiff judges inclined to allow juries 
to hear cases against businesses and insured defendants.205  
3. The Long History of Racial Exclusion from Southern Juries 
Most obviously, the South’s distinctive racial history 
contributed to its greater fear of juries with substantial numbers 
of African-American jurors. It was during the period between the 
mid-1960s and the mid-1980s that Southern business and 
political leaders, for the first time since Reconstruction, had 
reason to fear the impact of juries including substantial 
African-American representation.206  
The fact that Southern white leaders worried about how 
African-Americans would act as jurors is best corroborated by 
their century-long efforts to keep African-Americans from 
participating as jurors. While it is true that African-Americans 
also were underrepresented in juries in Northern states,207 efforts 
to exclude them from juries in the South appear to have been 
more harsh, widespread, and sustained. In the immediate 
aftermath of the Civil War, integrated juries became a “common 
sight” in a number of Southern states,208 and in 1879, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that a West Virginia statute that excluded 
                                                                                                     
 204. See generally Lamis, supra note 203 (“The second factor propelling the 
Republican Party in the South revolved around conservative economic issues 
tied to a restrictive view of the role of government . . . [and] it was now possible 
for southern conservatives to build a Republican Party along the lines of those 
in, for example, Pennsylvania or Ohio.”).  
 205. See, e.g., Litigation Abuse Reform Act of 1986: Hearing on S. 2038 and 
S. 2046 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 129 (1986) (statement 
of Sen. Mitch McConnell) (introducing bill and describing “the dramatic increase 
in the number of lawsuits filed . . . [and] the latest multimillion-dollar verdict”).  
 206. See, e.g., Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth 
Amendment as a Prohibition Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 
76 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 88 (1990) (arguing that after 1965 all-white juries could 
legally reign in most states until the Supreme Court’s decision in Baston v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)). 
 207. See id. at 92 (finding that during the period of 1965 through 1985, “the 
northern trial jury resemble[d] the all-white jury of the South”).  
 208. See id. at 50, 62 (“By 1870, the integrated jury was a common sight in 
[certain Southern states].”).  
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African-American citizens from participation as jurors violated 
the Equal Protection Clause.209 Southern states quickly found 
ways to circumvent the holding.210 In some instances, the names 
of African-Americans legally required to be included within the 
lists from which jury panels were drawn were printed on 
differently colored paper.211 In Mississippi, jury commissioners 
selected jurors from among those of “good intelligence, fair 
character, and sound judgment,”212 language they interpreted to 
exclude African-Americans.213 Even when states used voter 
registration rolls as a starting point from which to select a jury 
panel, African-Americans and the poor were excluded from voting 
by poll taxes and requirements that the voter be able to explain 
provisions of the state constitution, again administered in a 
highly discriminatory manner.214 By the first decade of the 
twentieth century, few African-Americans had served on juries in 
                                                                                                     
 209. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879) (concluding 
that excluding black jurors amounted to a “denial of the equal protection of the 
laws”). But see Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 589 (1896) (reasoning that 
nothing prevented a state “legislature from providing . . . that persons selected 
for jury service should possess good intelligence, sound judgment, and fair 
character”).  
 210. See Colbert, supra note 206, at 75 (noting that “[b]eginning in the early 
1880s, the former confederate states developed and implemented strategies to 
disenfranchise blacks and to prevent them from sitting as jurors”). 
 211. See NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 72 
(2007) (“White jurors’ names were printed on white tickets, while black jurors’ 
names appeared on yellow tickets, making it easier to determine the race of 
prospective jurors.”).  
 212. Smith v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 592, 592 (1896) (quotation omitted); see 
also Gibson, 162 U.S. at 565 (selecting jurors of “good intelligence, sound 
judgment, and fair character”). 
 213. See Colbert, supra note 206, at 76–77 (noting that the Court in 
Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898), “rebuked the defendant’s argument 
that the state had administered the jury . . . in an evil and discriminatory 
manner”); EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE, ILLEGAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN JURY 
SELECTION: A CONTINUING LEGACY 10 (2010), http://www.eji.org/files/EJI%20Race 
%20and%20Jury%20Report.pdf (“Theoretically valid but vague requirements for 
jury service were applied in practice to mean ‘no blacks allowed.’”); see also infra 
notes 234–238 and accompanying text (further discussing the use of a system 
involving “key men,” jury commissioners, or elected state officials to exclude 
African-American and poor jurors).  
 214. See Colbert, supra note 206, at 76 (noting that the “constitutional 
requirements limited voting and jury duty to citizens who could pay a poll tax, 
who had never been convicted of any larceny-related offenses, who could read 
and write, and who understood all sections of the state constitution”).  
602 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 557 (2016) 
the South, even in counties where they dramatically 
outnumbered white residents.215 
The tide began to shift against the most blatant means of 
excluding African-American jurors with the Supreme Court’s 
1935 decision in Norris v. Alabama.216 Although 
African-Americans were 18% of the county’s population, some of 
whom were college graduates, no one could remember an 
African-American serving on a jury.217 The Supreme Court found 
“it impossible to accept . . . [the] sweeping characterization” of the 
jury commissioner that there was not a single African-American 
in the county “who is generally reputed to be honest and 
intelligent and who is esteemed in the community for his 
integrity, good character, and sound judgment.”218  
In the following decades, prosecutors in criminal cases and 
defense counsel in personal injury cases relied heavily on 
peremptory challenges to keep African-Americans off juries in all 
regions of the United States, but particularly in the South.219 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court, as late as 1965 in Swain v. 
Alabama,220 sanctioned the prosecutor’s use of peremptory 
challenges to exclude all African-American jurors in criminal 
cases.221 However, during the next twenty years, it became 
                                                                                                     
 215. See GILBERT THOMAS STEPHENSON, RACE DISTINCTIONS IN AMERICAN LAW 
253–72 (1910) (describing the experiences of clerks in the South with black 
jurors). For example, 6,800 white persons and 8,000 African-Americans resided 
in one North Carolina county, but a county clerk observed that “very few 
Negroes serve on the juries . . . for the reasons that they are an illiterate race 
and moral character not what it should be.” Id. at 265. 
 216. See generally Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935) (deciding the 
appeal arising out of the infamous “Scottsboro Boys” case where the petitioner 
and eight other young African-American men were accused, and convicted by 
the jury, of raping two white women); see also N. Jeremi Duru, The Central Park 
Five, the Scottsboro Boys, and the Myth of the Bestial Black Man, 25 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1315, 1335–37 (2004) (discussing the Scottsboro cases).  
 217. Norris, 294 U.S. at 599.  
 218. Id. at 598–99.  
 219. See infra notes 220–228 and accompanying text (discussing the use of 
peremptory challenges). 
 220. See 380 U.S. 202, 221 (1965) (“[W]e cannot hold that the striking of 
Negroes in a particular case is a denial of equal protection of the laws. In the 
quest for an impartial and qualified jury, Negro and white, Protestant and 
Catholic, are alike subject to being challenged without cause.”), overruled by 
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).  
 221. See id. (discussing the use of peremptory challenges). 
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gradually more evident that the Supreme Court would eventually 
prevent counsel from systematically using peremptory challenges 
to remove African-American jurors.222 This, of course, was 
precisely the period of time when Southern supreme courts 
rejected the changes in the law making it easier for plaintiffs to 
gain access to juries that courts elsewhere in the country were 
adopting.223  
Eventually, in 1986, the Supreme Court in Batson v. 
Kentucky224 made it far easier to prove that the exclusion of 
African-Americans from the jury constituted a violation of an 
African-American defendant’s constitutional rights.225 In Batson, 
the Court emphasized that the criminal defendant himself was 
African-American,226 but in 1991 in Powers v. Ohio,227 the Court 
held “that a criminal defendant may object to race-based 
exclusions of jurors effected through peremptory challenges 
whether or not the defendant and the excluded jurors share the 
same race.”228 Presumably, the Supreme Court recognized that 
studies have shown that African-American jurors are more 
                                                                                                     
 222. In the two decades following Swain, a number of federal and state 
appellate courts in regions of the country other than the South held that a 
criminal defendant could demonstrate an equal protection violation by proving 
that the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to exclude African-American 
jurors in the defendant’s particular case and need not overcome the far more 
burdensome requirement that the prosecutor systematically excluded 
African-American jurors across a range of cases. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 82 n.1 
(listing cases). At the same time, federal and state courts in the South 
predominantly rejected this more manageable standard. See id. (same).  
 223. See id. (listing cases where Southern state courts rejected these 
changes). 
 224. See 476 U.S. at 96–97 (holding that once an African-American criminal 
defendant proved that the prosecutor had removed African-Americans from the 
jury venire and “circumstances raise an inference” that these peremptory 
challenges were race-based, “the burden shifts to the State to come forward with 
a neutral explanation for challenging black jurors”).  
 225. See id. at 96–97 (listing cases). 
 226. See id. at 96 (providing the standards for showing prima facie 
discrimination in the venire selection context).  
 227. 499 U.S. 400 (1991).  
 228. Id. at 402. Despite Batson and Powell, strong evidence supports the 
notion that African-Americans continue to be significantly underrepresented in 
criminal juries, particularly in the South. See, e.g., EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE, 
supra note 213, at 14 (concluding that “peremptory strikes are used to exclude 
African Americans . . . from jury service at high rates . . . , particularly in the 
South”).  
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inclined to vote for acquittal in criminal cases,229 just as most 
participants in the civil justice system believe that 
African-American jurors favor tort plaintiffs. Most critically for 
our purposes, during the same term as Powers was decided, the 
Supreme Court held in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.230 that 
a party in civil litigation was entitled to have his case heard by a 
jury in which the other party had not excluded jurors on the basis 
of race.231 Edmondson, of course, was decided after Southern 
courts disproportionately failed to follow those courts elsewhere 
in the country that had already adopted substantive principles 
governing tort cases that made it easier for plaintiffs to have 
their cases heard by the jury.232 After Edmondson opened the 
doors to substantially greater African-American participation on 
Southern juries, principles of outmoded substantive tort law 
became principal bulwarks to prevent personal injury plaintiffs 
from having their cases heard by the jury.233  
In the midst of the period when states other than those in the 
South were changing their law to enable personal injury plaintiffs 
to have their cases decided by juries, Professor Jon M. Van Dyke 
published his definitive account of jury selection processes in the 
various states.234 Professor Van Dyke found that twelve of the 
sixteen states in the South permitted local “jury commissioners” 
or elected officials to exercise discretion in selecting the members 
of the jury venire.235 At that time, only four Southern states and 
the District of Columbia selected the members of their jury 
                                                                                                     
 229. See Stephen P. Garvey et al., Juror First Votes in Criminal Trials, 1 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 371, 377 (2004) (reporting that African-American jurors 
are statistically more likely to vote to acquit in criminal trials). 
 230. 500 U.S. 614 (1991).  
 231. See id. at 616 (holding that, in civil cases, “race-based exclusion violates 
the equal protection rights of the challenged jurors”).  
 232. See, e.g., supra notes 230–231 and accompanying text (discussing the 
Edmonson case). 
 233. See infra tbl.1 (showing that Southern states disproportionately pose 
the greatest obstacles to the plaintiff having his case heard by the jury); 
Appendix A, tbl.2 (showing disproportionately anti-plaintiff tort doctrines in 
Southern states).  
 234. See generally JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR 
UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS (1977).  
 235. See id. at 87 (“In the South, [some states] . . . have statutes that permit 
local jury commissioners to exercise a great deal of discretion in choosing 
jurors.”); see also id. app. A at 258–62. 
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panels randomly from voter registration lists.236 In contrast, the 
overwhelming majority of states that were not a part of the South 
selected their prospective juries randomly from voter registration 
lists. The use of jury commissioners in Southern states enabled 
them “to select persons they know, namely, the ‘established’ 
members of the community.”237 The desired and expected result, 
of course, was that both African-Americans and poor whites 
continued to be underrepresented on Southern juries. According 
to Professor Van Dyke’s findings in 1977—during the era of great 
transformation in tort law—“the surveys from the southern 
states . . . show that blacks are not filling the percentage of seats 
on the juries that their population warrants.”238  
4. Resistance to “Judicial Activism” 
The distinctive racial and economic histories of the South led 
its political and business leaders of the region in the 1970s and 
1980s to distrust both “activist” judges and newly empowered 
African-American jurors. To many leaders of Southern politics 
and business, the courts elsewhere in the country that changed 
tort law during the late 1960s through the mid-1980s were 
dominated by policy-driven “judicial activists.”239 As such, the 
more pro-plaintiff tort decisions from these courts evoked the 
critics’ then-recent response to what they perceived as the judicial 
activism of the Warren Court and other federal courts in 
                                                                                                     
 236. See id. at 258–62 (discussing the discretion granted to jury 
commissioners).  
 237. Id. at 87.  
 238. Id. at 30.  
 239. See William M. McCormick, The American Tort System: A Time to 
Rebalance the Scales of Justice, in 52 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 267, 269 
(1986) (noting that “the enormous changes in legal doctrine” had occurred 
“without much public debate or even notice”); cf. Irvin Molotsky, Reagan 
Reiterates Support for Liability Suit Limits, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 1986), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1986/05/31/us/reagan-reiterates-support-for-liability-
suit-limits.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2016) (quoting Reagan administration 
Attorney General Edwin Meese: “What some of the liberal attorneys and liberal 
judges did to criminal law in the 1960’s and 70’s, they are now, in the 1980’s, 
trying to do to civil law”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
McCormick served as CEO of North Carolina-based Fireman’s Fund Insurance. 
McCormick, supra note 239, at 267. 
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dismantling de jure segregation in the South.240 Further, 
new-fangled tort doctrines that focused on the policy 
consequences of torts decisions, instead of on the moral 
responsibilities of tort plaintiffs and defendants,241 sounded out of 
tune in the South where religious values focused on “a moral 
outlook grounded in the Bible”; principles that were beginning to 
reshape Southern conservative politics.242 These factors 
contributed to the decisions of Southern courts and legislatures to 
decline to join the trend in substantive tort law sweeping the 
nation that allowed more personal injury cases to be heard by 
juries.  
C. The Political Leanings of State Governments 
The American civil justice system has become highly 
politicized since the 1970s, and perhaps it always has been.243 
Plaintiffs’ lawyers are traditionally in tune politically with 
Democrats and liberals, and businesses and insurances 
                                                                                                     
 240. For example, James J. Kilpatrick, a Virginia-based newspaper 
columnist read throughout the country, described the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), in this manner: “In May of 
1954, that inept fraternity of politicians and professors known as the United 
States Supreme Court chose to throw away the established law. These nine 
men . . . rewrote the fundamental law of this land to suit their own gauzy 
concepts of sociology.” Court Order Gets Varied Reaction from Region’s 
Newspapers, SOUTHERN SCH. NEWS, June 8, 1955, at 8; see also Michael J. 
Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV. 431, 487 
(2005) (describing how “critics assailed Brown v. Board of Education as 
unprincipled judicial activism . . . indulging in sociology”). 
 241. The California Supreme Court often led the movement toward more 
expansive liability and explained its changes to the common law by citing policy 
implications. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 936 (Cal. 1980) 
(justifying the adoption of market share liability on the basis of loss distribution 
and loss minimization).  
 242. See Charles Reagan Wilson, Making the South: Religion in a Twentieth-
Century Region, in THE AMERICAN SOUTH IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, supra note 
188, at 210, 213 (concluding that “leading denominations were among the 
region’s most powerful institutions, parts of an establishment whose members 
had close ties to other leaders in politics, economics, and education”).  
 243. See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 177–78 (1949) 
(claiming that the fact “[t]hat the defendant is a wealthy corporation and the 
plaintiff is a poor boy . . . often determine[s] who will win or lose”); LAWRENCE M. 
FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 365–66 (3d ed. 2005) (noting that 
discontent with the tort system began as early as the mid-nineteenth century).  
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companies are aligned with Republicans and conservatives. In 
this Subpart we consider the possible role played by the political 
leanings of state governments.  
Plaintiffs’ trial lawyers, like Democratic Party activists and 
other liberals, perceive that they are fighting for the “little guy.” 
As Sara Parikh and Bryant Garth observe in their study of the 
emergence of the plaintiffs’ bar in Chicago, plaintiffs’ lawyers 
“alignment with the Democratic Party (the party of ‘ordinary 
people’) reinforces their identity as underdogs fighting on behalf 
of those who cannot help themselves.”244 Liberals also see the 
jury as an important democratic institution, responding to abuses 
of powerful actors including both the government245 and 
corporations and other businesses.246 In contrast, conservatives 
and Republicans view tort law as yet another vehicle that 
interferes with the operation of the free enterprise system.247 
These relationships echo the historical demographic patterns 
of attorneys representing each party in tort litigation. Following 
World War II, corporate law firms “recruited almost exclusively 
from a WASP establishment legitimated with degrees from Ivy 
League schools,”248 by nature a conservative group, and most 
often Republican. Those with working-class or immigrant 
backgrounds, on the other hand, generally attended local law 
                                                                                                     
 244. Sara Parikh & Bryant Garth, Philip Corboy and the Construction of the 
Plaintiffs’ Personal Injury Bar, 30 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 269, 300 (2005). 
 245. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. 
REV. 12, 18 (1910) (“The will of the state . . . imposed on a reluctant 
community . . . find[s] the same obstacle in the local jury that formerly 
confronted kings and ministers.”).  
 246. See, e.g., ROGER CHAPMAN & JAMES CIMENT, CULTURE WARS: AN 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISSUES, VIEWPOINTS, AND VOICES 672 (2d ed. 2015) (stating 
that liberal, consumer interest groups “argue that liability lawsuits are a means 
to hold injury-causing parties accountable”). 
 247. See, e.g., Excessive Litigation’s Impact on America’s Global 
Competitiveness: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution and Civil 
Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 8 (2013) (statement of 
Rep. Bob Goodlatte, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary) (testifying that “a 
prosperous free enterprise economy . . . depends on a tort system that is . . . free 
of meritless litigation and excessive damage awards”).  
 248. Parikh & Garth, supra note 244, at 275. 
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schools, often worked with the Democratic Party machine, and 
many eventually became plaintiffs’ attorneys.249 
Following the period from the late 1960s through the 
mid-1980s when courts in most jurisdictions adopted a variety of 
changes to the common law that benefited plaintiffs, insurance 
companies and businesses responded vigorously by promoting a 
wide variety of tort reform measures that limited liability. This 
further politicized the tort system. As would be expected, 
conservatives and Republicans most often supported the tort 
reform measures, while Democrats and liberals opposed them.250 
In 1994, tort reform became a key component of Republican 
Congressman Newt Gingrich’s “Contract with America.”251 Today, 
the current Republican Platform identifies “Reducing Costs 
Through Tort Reform” as one example of “Renewing American 
Values.”252 Conversely, the platform of the nation’s largest state 
Democratic Party, California, states that “our civil justice system 
has come under concerted attack by corporations shielding 
themselves from civil liability for wrongful conduct by using their 
money and power to deny everyday people fair access to the 
courts.”253 The Party promises to “[t]rust juries to determine the 
appropriate level of compensation for a prevailing plaintiff in a 
lawsuit.”254 Thus, by the late 1980s, the identification of 
Republican conservatives as anti-plaintiff and anti-jury became 
even more firmly established, and Democrats and liberals were 
                                                                                                     
 249. See id. at 275–77 (discussing the development and composition of the 
plaintiffs’ bar). 
 250. See id. at 285 (describing how a law revision commission could address 
issues of tort reform while avoiding political controversy).  
 251. See Carl Tobias, Common Sense and Other Legal Reforms, 48 VAND. L. 
REV. 699, 700 (1995) (discussing the tort reform proposals included in the 
Contract with America). 
 252. See Republican Platform: Renewing American Values, REPUBLICAN 
NAT’L COMMISSION, https://www.gop.com/platform/renewing-american-values/ 
(last visited Mar. 13, 2016) (stating a commitment to “aggressively pursuing tort 
reform legislation”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also 
Report of Permanent Committee on Platform and Resolutions, REPUBLICAN 
PARTY OF TEX. 10 (2014), http://www.texasgop.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/ 
06/2014-Platform-Final.pdf (supporting the “continuation of common sense tort 
reform”).  
 253. 2014 Platform, CAL. DEMOCRATIC PARTY 5 (2014), 
http://www.cadem.org/our-california/platform/body/2014-Platform-3.11.141.pdf. 
 254. Id. at 5.  
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even more closely aligned with the idea that personal injury 
plaintiffs should be entitled to have their cases heard by juries. 
As can be expected, the pro-plaintiff leanings of Democrats 
and liberals led to greater financial backing from plaintiffs’ 
attorneys. Conversely, businesses and insurance companies 
contribute far more heavily to Republicans. This, in turn, 
strengthened the polarization of the two parties on tort issues. 
For example, during the 2014 election cycle, the American 
Association for Justice, the trade organization of plaintiffs’ 
attorneys, contributed more than $2 million to Democratic 
candidates for Congress, but less than $100,000 to Republican 
candidates.255 At the same time, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
spent over $25 million on campaign advertisements promoting 
Republican congressional candidates and a mere $375,300 on 
advertisements promoting Democratic candidates.256  
In addition to these substantial contributions by lawyers and 
repeat players in the civil justice system to legislators, both 
groups also made substantial contributions to judicial races. 
According to the National Center for State Courts (NCSC), 
between 1980 and 1986, near the end of the period in which tort 
law became decidedly more pro-plaintiff, campaign contributions 
to candidates in contested appellate court races in Texas 
increased 250%.257 These contributions came largely from tort 
reform groups, businesses, and organizations of plaintiffs’ 
lawyers, each with a stake in the tort system.258 
                                                                                                     
 255. American Ass’n for Justice: Recipients, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., 
www.opensecrets.org/orgs/toprecips.php?id=D000000065&cycle=2014 (last 
visited Mar. 13, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 256. US Chamber of Commerce: Summary, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/summary.php?id=D000019798 (last visited 
Mar. 13, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 257. Judicial Campaigns and Elections: Texas, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, 
www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/campaigns_and_elections/campaign
_financing.cfm?state=TX (last visited Mar. 13, 2016) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 258. See id. (reporting that of the amounts contributed to “the seven winning 
candidates for the Texas Supreme Court . . . more than 40% was contributed by 
parties or lawyers with cases before the court or by contributors linked to those 
parties. . . .”). Furthermore, “[i]n the early 1980s, plaintiff lawyers were the 
largest contributors to Texas judicial candidates, but in the late 1980s and 
1990s, they were replaced by civil defense attorneys, doctors, insurance 
companies, and other business interests.” Id. 
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The espoused values of the Democratic Party, the often 
common demographic origins of both its supporters and the 
plaintiffs’ bar, and the plaintiffs’ bar’s large campaign 
contributions to the Democratic Party all would lead one to 
hypothesize that in states in which Democrats predominate, tort 
law would allow injured plaintiffs a better chance of having their 
cases heard by the jury. In contrast, one would assume that in 
those states where Republicans dominate, the corresponding but 
sharply contrasting factors would make it more difficult for 
plaintiffs to have their cases reach the jury.  
IV. Testing the Effects of Race, Income Inequality, Regional 
History, and State Politics on a State’s Degree of Jury Access 
Denial 
To compare the extent to which each state’s substantive law 
governing tort cases impedes the plaintiff’s ability to have her 
case decided by the jury, we calculated a quantifiable Jury Access 
Denial Index (JADI) for each state. Subpart A of this Part 
describes how we calculated each state’s JADI. In Subpart B, we 
rank the respective degrees of difficulty for the plaintiff to have 
her case decided by the jury in each of seventeen states. 
Once the JADI is available for each state, it then becomes 
possible to test for correlations between each state’s JADI and the 
various factors previously discussed in Part III. Appendix B, 
Table 3, indicates, for each of the seventeen states tested, its 
JADI and the quantifiable indices for each of the key variables 
from the state, including income inequality in its largest cities, 
the percentage of African-Americans in these cities, whether or 
not the state was a part of the historic South, and the political 
leanings of the state government.259 
Multivariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) was the 
technique of choice to test the impact of these variables. It is a 
technique well adapted to models with various levels of 
measurement. In the present case, the JADI is at the interval 
level, a truly numeric variable, whereas region is a nominal 
dichotomy simply divided into the South and states that were not 
                                                                                                     
 259. See infra Appendix B, tbl.3 (Values of Key Study Variables). 
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a part of the historic South.260 As will become apparent, there are 
complex interconnections among the model variables. In such 
situations, there is a premium on tests that allow for statistical 
controls to identify separate effects and test for the effects of 
combinations of variables, technically termed “interaction 
effects.” ANOVA offers these capabilities.261  
Given the exploratory nature of the present study, analysis 
commenced by dichotomizing the key independent variables. For 
the analysis of each variable, we divided states into those where 
the major urban areas are characterized by a high degree of 
income inequality and those with a low degree of income 
inequality; those with cities with a high percentage of 
African-American residents and those with a low percentage of 
African-American residents; and finally, those states that were a 
part of the traditional South and those that were not.  
In Subpart C, we test the possible effect of a high degree of 
income inequality in a state’s leading municipalities on its degree 
of acceptance of substantive law doctrines that deny plaintiffs 
access to juries. Subpart D tests for a possible correlation 
between a high percentage of African-Americans in a state’s 
leading municipalities and its Jury Access Denial Index. In 
Subpart E, we test for a possible correlation between a state’s 
history as part of the South and a high JADI. Subpart F 
examines multivariate relations among income inequality, race, 
and region in affecting a state’s JADI. Finally, in Subpart G, we 
consider as an alternative explanation that a state’s JADI is 
affected by its liberal or conservative political leanings. 
                                                                                                     
 260. See supra note 188 and accompanying text (listing the states regarded 
as part of the South).  
 261. ANOVA is conducted by calculating F, which is the ratio of estimated 
variance between separate samples to the estimated variance within the 
samples. If F is sufficiently high, it indicates that the variable being evaluated 
has a significant effect. The F-statistic is considered sufficiently high when the 
statistical probability value (p) is extremely low. The p-value represents the 
percentage probability that the difference in response values is produced by 
chance or random errors. For example, a p < 0.05 means that the probability 
that the difference of the means for two categories due to chance is less than 5%, 
the standard for statistical significance.  
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A. Quantifying the Jury Access Denial Factors for Seventeen 
States 
Each state’s JADI is based on a weighted sum of ratings 
reflecting the extent to which the state continues to follow five 
older doctrines, or sets of doctrines, that pose obstacles to the 
plaintiff’s ability to have her case decided by the jury. 
We begin by assigning a score to each state on each issue 
ranging from 5—representing the greatest impact in denying 
access to juries—to 0—representing little or no impact in denying 
access to juries. In other words, on any particular issue, if a state 
continues to follow the traditional doctrine that denies the 
plaintiff access to the jury, we assigned a score of 5. On the other 
hand, if the state now totally rejects traditional doctrines in any 
of the five categories that prevent the plaintiff from reaching the 
jury, we assigned a score of 0. In some of the categories, we 
assigned scores between 0 and 5 because states adopted 
intermediate positions or, in a handful of instances, ambiguous 
rules. Finally, we more frequently assigned intermediate scores 
to states on the categories of “limited-duty rules in premises 
liability cases” and “other no-duty and limited-duty rules,” 
because a state’s score for each of these categories included a 
combination of values derived from the state’s positions on 
multiple issues.262 Appendix A provides detailed explanations for 
how we assigned a state’s score on each issue.263  
Obviously, some of the traditional doctrines that blocked the 
plaintiff’s access to the jury had greater impact measured across 
the entire universe of personal injury tort cases than did others. 
To assist us in weighting the relative importance of the five 
issues, we called upon a panel of twelve experienced and racially 
diverse judges and attorneys who are highly regarded by their 
peers. This group included four judges, four plaintiffs’ attorneys 
with varying specialties in tort law, and four defense attorneys 
with varying specialties.264 Each respondent was asked to assess 
                                                                                                     
 262. However, we were consistent in evaluating each category on a 0 to 5 
scale. Within the last two categories, each sub-issue was assigned a number of 
points reflecting its relative impact on denying jury access compared to the 
other sub-issues within the same category. Infra Appendix A. 
 263. Infra Appendix A, tbl.2 and accompanying footnotes.  
 264. See supra Author’s Footnote * for a list of the experts we surveyed.  
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the relative importance of state-to-state variations in the five 
categories of legal doctrines described in the previous Subpart in 
determining how easy or how difficult it is for plaintiffs in the 
aggregate, ranging across all types of tort cases, to get their cases 
to the jury. The respondents were instructed that they should 
consider not only judicial dismissals at the motion for summary 
judgment and directed verdict stages, but also how these 
doctrines affect plaintiff counsel’s initial decision to accept a 
client’s case. We asked each survey respondent to allocate 100 
points among the five sets of legal doctrines reflecting the relative 
importance of each, so that an issue that he or she believed is 
twice as important as another issue should be allocated twice as 
many points. The mean points allocated for each of the five 
categories of legal issues by the twelve respondents follow:  
1. The Choice Between Contributory  
Negligence and Comparative Fault:  35.42 points.265 
2. Limited Duty Rules in Premises  
Liability Cases:     12.50 points. 
3. Other No-Duty and Limited-Duty Rules:  20.83 points. 
4. Limitations on the Liability  
of Charitable Institutions:    11.25 points. 
5. Standards Governing the  
Admissibility of Expert Testimony:  20.83 points. 
We then multiplied the score for each issue in a particular 
state by the weighting factor assigned by our panel of experienced 
judges, plaintiffs’ attorneys, and defense counsel. For example, 
because our survey respondents assessed the choice between 
contributory negligence and comparative fault as having the 
greatest impact and assigned it a mean score of 35.42 points out 
of 100 possible points, we multiplied each state’s score reflecting 
the extent to which its law on the issue of how plaintiff’s own 
negligence affects her recovery—the 0 to 5 scale—by the 
weighting factor of 35.42.  
                                                                                                     
 265. As a result of the rounding process, the mean total points allocated are 
100.83.  
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Finally, after we determined the weighted anti-jury score for 
each issue in a particular state, we summed these five weighted 
anti-jury scores to determine the state’s JADI.  
B. Ranking the States’ Degrees of Difficulty for Plaintiffs to Reach 
the Jury 
We selected seventeen states for our study that are diverse in 
terms of the following criteria: (1) the racial demographics of the 
state’s largest cities; (2) a state’s history as part of the traditional 
South; and (3) the state’s political and ideological leanings. For 
example, in eight of our states, the population of each state’s 
largest cities is more than 30% African-American; in the 
remaining nine states, it is less than 30%.266 Eight of the states 
were part of the traditional South,267 while the remaining states 
were not. In 1980, near the end of the period of time when 
massive change was taking place in many states making it easier 
for plaintiffs to have their cases decided by the jury, slightly more 
than half of our states were politically conservative.268 
After determining the JADIs for each of the seventeen states 
using the methodology described in the preceding Subpart, we 
ranked the states from the highest JADI to the lowest:269  
                                                                                                     
 266. Infra Appendix B, tbl.3.  
 267. Infra Appendix B, tbl.3. 
 268. Infra Appendix B, tbl.3. 
 269. Again, we stress that our index measures only the impact of 
substantive law principles applied in tort cases in posing obstacles that prevent 
the plaintiff’s case from being decided by the jury and does not necessarily 
reflect unarticulated tendencies of state court judges in deciding whether to 
grant summary judgments and directed verdicts. Further, our measure of the 
anti-plaintiff and anti-jury impact of substantive law doctrines says nothing 
about whether juries themselves are biased in favor of either plaintiffs or 
defendants.  
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Table 1. Ranking States by Jury Access Denial Index 
 State 
Jury Access Denial 
Index 
 Maximum possible points 500 
1. Virginia 492.90 
2. Maryland 378.34 
3. Alabama 377.50 
4. North Carolina 335.38 
5. South Carolina 265.82 
6. Texas  265.82 
7. New Jersey 234.75 
8. Massachusetts 227.07 
9. Indiana 220.82 
10. Michigan 190.61 
11. Arizona 174.98 
12. Kentucky 166.65 
13. Kansas 137.49 
14. Florida 83.32 
15. Illinois 81.25 
16. California 52.08 
17. Washington 50.00 
  
616 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 557 (2016) 
Our rankings do not align with the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce “State Liability Systems Ranking Study.”270 The 
substantive law governing whether a personal injury plaintiff is 
able to have her case heard by the jury plays only a marginal role 
in the Chamber’s rankings.271 Instead, the Chamber survey 
respondents, consisting largely of corporate counsel and other 
business leaders, identified “biased or partial juries/judges” as by 
far the most important factor in their ratings.272 Not surprisingly, 
this leads to the apparent anomaly that the Chamber ratings and 
our JADI scores have a crude negative association.273 However, 
this apparent discrepancy can be easily explained. When 
                                                                                                     
 270. See generally U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, 2012 STATE LIAB. 
SYSTEM SURVEY: LAWSUIT CLIMATE, RANKING THE STATES (2012), 
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/documents/files/lr_FinalWeb_PD
F.pdf. 
 271. See id. at 3 (identifying “limits on discovery,” “elimination of 
unnecessary lawsuits,” and “fairness and impartiality [of judges and jurors] as 
more important factors than “tort reform”).  
 272. Id. at 3–4. Fully a third of the respondents mentioned this as an 
important factor. Id. at 3. The report continues that the “next tier” of reasons 
proffered by survey respondents “includes corrupt/unfair system (9%), a slow 
process (9%), anti-business/anti-corporate environment (8%), unreasonable 
rulings/verdicts (6%), incompetent juries/judges (5%), and excessive damages 
awards (5%).” Id. at 3–4.  
 273. We compared the Chamber’s litigation climate ratings (where a higher 
number is more pro-business) with our Jury Access Denial Index scores (where 
a higher number makes it more difficult for the plaintiff to reach the jury and 
therefore favors defendants—usually businesses and others covered by 
insurance). Because we compared only seventeen states, it was not possible to 
convincingly determine whether the correlation between the two sets of scores 
was positive or negative. We categorized each state as a “high” or “low” jury 
access denial state on the basis of whether its Jury Access Denial Index was 
greater than or less than the median score for all seventeen states. Similarly, we 
classified each state as a “high” or “low” on the basis of the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce’s liability systems rankings. In twelve of the seventeen cases, a state 
with a high rating on one of the variables received a low rating on the other 
variable:  
 Low Chamber Liability 
Rating 
High Chamber Liability 
Rating 
Low Jury Access 
Denial Index 
3 states 6 states 
High Jury Access 
Denial Index 
6 states  3 states 
This indicates that states with higher Chamber Liability Ratings have lower 
JADIs and vice versa.  
KEEPING CASES FROM BLACK JURIES 617 
appellate judges and legislators perceive that juries and trial 
judges are biased, the most prevalent factor cited in the Chamber 
survey, they are more inclined to leave in place older substantive 
law doctrines that make it more difficult for the plaintiff to have 
her case decided by the jury. The message to policymakers here is 
that substantive principles of tort law play only a modest role in 
determining the business community’s perception of the liability 
climate.  
C. The Effect of a High Degree of Income Inequality in a State’s 
Leading Municipalities 
To determine the effect of income inequality on a state’s 
JADI, we investigated the association between the JADI and the 
Gini coefficient in the state’s largest municipalities. The Gini 
coefficient is the most widely accepted measure of income 
inequality among economists and other social scientists.274 A 
society where all income was distributed entirely equally would 
have a Gini coefficient equal to zero.275 A totally unequal society, 
where a single person earned all the income, would have a Gini 
coefficient of one.276 
Rather than looking at the extent of income inequality within 
an entire state, we focused only on the Gini coefficient within a 
state’s largest municipalities. Publicity about “out-of-control 
juries” focuses on urban juries, not those in suburban and rural 
areas. In some states, a single city, such as Boston, dominates the 
images that judges and legislators have about urban juries. In 
other states, policymakers’ conceptions of urban jury behavior are 
likely to be based on juries in a number of large cities, such as, in 
Florida, Miami, Tampa, Orlando, Jacksonville, and St. 
Petersburg. Accordingly, in some states we compared the state’s 
JADI with the level of income inequality in only a single 
                                                                                                     
 274. See generally AMARTYA SEN & JAMES FOSTER, ON ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 
30 (1973) (explaining the Gini coefficient and describing it as “very widely used 
to represent the extent of inequality”); David Kamin, Reducing Poverty, Not 
Inequality: What Changes in the Tax System Can Achieve, 66 TAX L. REV. 593, 
599–600 (2013) (explaining how the Gini coefficient is calculated).  
 275. See Kamin, supra note 274, at 600 (noting that the coefficient equals 
zero because the Lorenz curve follows the line of equality). 
 276. Id. 
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dominant urban center; in others, we compared the JADI with 
the levels of income inequality in a number of large urban legal 
centers.  
We began by dividing the Gini coefficients of the cities into 
those that were above the median and those below the median 
and determining the mean JADI for each group. Figure 1 displays 
the effect of the dichotomized Gini score on the state JADIs 
shown in Table 1. The upward-trending line suggests a positive 
association, with higher inequality areas showing a higher JADI 
(right-hand dot) than lower inequality areas (left-hand dot). 
However, this difference is not statistically significant. 
 













D. The Effect of High Percentages of African-Americans in a 
State’s Leading Municipalities 
We then tested the association between a high or low 
percentage of African-Americans in a state’s largest 
municipalities and a state’s JADI score. Our analysis paralleled 
the approach used with the Gini coefficients. We divided the 
cities into two groups: those where the percentage of the 
population that was African-American was above the median for 
all the cities we studied and those where the percentage was 
                                                                                                     
 277. F = 0.249, p = n.s. 
240 
low high Gini Coefficient 
JADI 
219 
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below the median. We then determined the mean JADI for each 
group. Figure 2 displays a rapidly rising line slope signifying 
much higher JADIs for states in which the largest cities include a 
higher percentage of African-American residents. This result is 
statistically significant. Also, the difference in the two means 
represented by the dots is nearly 120 JADI points, which would 
suggest substantive significance as well. 278  
 
Figure 2. JADI Score by Percentage of African-Americans 















                                                                                                     
 278. See HUBERT M. BLALOCK, JR., SOCIAL STATISTICS 299–303 (rev. 2d ed. 
1979) (explaining that substantive significance describes the quantity of the 
effect of one variable on the other). In other words, a higher percentage of 
African-Americans in the population is likely to have a large or substantial 
effect on JADI scores.  




low high Percentage of African-Americans 
170 
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E. The Effect of a State’s History as Part of the South 
Figure 3 displays the most dramatic result thus far. States 
in the South manifest a much higher average JADI than other 
states, about 151 points, which translates into a clearly 
statistically significant difference. 














F. Interactions Among the Variables of Income Inequality, Race, 
and Region 
No matter how dramatic the correlations between a state’s 
JADI and either the racial composition of its largest cities or its 
role as part of the historic South, neither of these bivariate 
analyses should be over-interpreted because of the complex 
interconnections among the variables.  
                                                                                                     





Part of the South? 
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Figure 4. JADI Score by Percentage of African-Americans 
in Largest Cities281 
 





















                                                                                                     
 281. For Region, F = 21.583, p = < .001. For percent African-American, 
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 Figure 4 justifies this reticence. Panel 4A displays the effect 
of the percentage of African-Americans in a state’s largest cities 
on the JADI for states that are not a part of the South. The lower, 
purple line represents those cities with a Gini coefficient less 
than the median, that is, a low degree of income inequality. The 
upper, green line represents cities with a high Gini coefficient. 
The parallel paths of these lines indicates that in states that are 
not part of the South, a higher percentage of African-Americans 
in the largest cities is associated with higher mean JADIs 
(represented by the higher dots to the right) regardless of 
whether there is a low or a high degree of income inequality.  
Panel 4B, for Southern states, shows that the right-hand dot 
is only slightly higher than the one at the left for the low-Gini 
coefficient condition, the purple line, but the rise for the high Gini 
line, the green line representing a high degree of income 
inequality, is more pronounced. Nevertheless, the main upward 
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The ANOVA statistical breakdown of the data displayed in 
Figure 4 yields three major conclusions. First, in multivariate 
comparison with these three variables, the Gini coefficient—
extent of income inequality—shows no significant separate effect. 
Second, net of the other two independent variables, region—
whether a state was part of the historic South or not—exerts the 
most powerful separate effect. Third and finally, the percentage 
of African-Americans in a state’s largest cities exerts a significant 
effect on a state’s JADI score independently of region and income 
inequality. 
G. The Effects of Politics and Ideology 
To compare our jury access denial scores with the politics or 
ideology of the state, we use the “NOMINATE measure of state 
government ideology,” originally developed by political scientists 
William D. Berry, Evan J. Ringquist, Richard C. Fording, and 
Russell L. Hanson282 and widely accepted among government and 
political science scholars. We compared each state’s NOMINATE 
                                                                                                     
 282. The NOMINATE scores measure the liberal/conservative slant of each 
state’s elected officials. See generally William D. Berry et al., Measuring Citizen 
and Government Ideology in the American States, 1960–93, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
327 (1998); see also William D. Berry et al., Measuring Citizen and Government 
Ideology in the U.S. States: A Re-appraisal, 10 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 117, 117 
(2010) (explaining how these “ideology indicators” help to assess both the impact 
of public opinion and the policy preferences of elected officials). The scores begin 
with ratings of a state’s members of Congress based on their votes on a variety 
of issues and then assumes that the ideological positions of state officials—the 
governor and members of the state legislature—mirror the ideological positions 
of the members of a state’s congressional delegation from the same party. Id. at 
118, 120.  
In the 2010 indices used in this Article, William D. Berry and his colleagues 
employed new input values, termed NOMINATE “common space” scores, which 
assessed a broader array of congressional votes than the previous indices based 
on interest-group ratings. Id. at 117. The authors report that the new input 
measures yield more accurate results. Id.; see also Richard C. Fording, Updated 
and Revised Citizen and Government Ideology Measures Through 2010 (Sept. 
12, 2012) (providing NOMINATE values used in our study) (on file with 
authors); Richard C. Fording, State Ideology Data, https://rcfording. 
wordpress.com/state-ideology-data/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2016) (follow “Excel 
format” hyperlink under “Updated Measures of Citizen and Government 
Ideology (last updated Mar. 19, 2005)” to download data through 2013) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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index for both 1980 and 2010 with its JADI. We hypothesized 
that the 1980 measure of political ideology would be associated 
with a state’s JADI because 1980 was near the end of the period 
that the law of most states was changing substantially in a 
direction allowing plaintiffs to have their cases decided by juries. 
We also wanted to see whether an association existed between a 
state’s JADI and the current political ideology of its government. 

















Figure 5 shows that 1980 NOMINATE scores, reflecting the 
degree of liberalism among the leaders of state government, are 
strongly negatively related to JADI scores. This effect is 
statistically and substantively significant. The average JADI 
score is about 160 points lower when the 1980 NOMINATE scores 
are high. Although the multivariate analyses are not shown here, 
these effects persist even if the other two variables, the 
percentage of African-Americans residing in a state’s largest 
cities and whether or not the state is part of the South, are 
incorporated in the analyses. In other words, as we anticipated, 
higher levels of liberalism in 1980 are associated with state legal 
doctrines that make it easier for the tort plaintiff to have her case 
decided by the jury. 
                                                                                                     







1980 NOMINATE Score 
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Surprisingly, however, the 2010 NOMINATE scores are 
strongly positively related to the JADI scores. In other words, 
states with more liberal government leaders in 2010 tend to 
follow tort doctrines that make it more difficult for plaintiffs to 
have their cases decided by juries. This effect is statistically and 
substantively significant. The more liberal half of the states (high 
2010 NOMINATE indices) scored an average of more than 100 
JADI points higher than did the more conservative half of the 
states (low 2010 NOMINATE indices). The switch from the 
association between liberal political leanings among state 
governments and easier jury access for plaintiffs in 1980 to the 
opposite result in 2010 persists even when multivariate analyses 
incorporate the effects resulting from both the percentage of 
African-American populations in the states’ largest cities and 
whether or not the state is a part of the South. 
The fact that there is a negative association in 1980 and a 
strong positive association in 2010 appears to be inconsistent and 
confusing. Although we cannot totally explain this result, we offer 
the following observations. For most of the categories of legal 
issues we evaluated, the strong movement to allow juries to 
                                                                                                     











626 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 557 (2016) 
decide more cases was already ending by the 1980s. Hence, we 
believe that the NOMINATE scores from 1980, and the resulting 
negative association between political liberalism and JADI 
scores, is the more relevant comparison. In most instances, if a 
state had not moved toward a more jury-accessible position by the 
mid-1980s, it was unlikely to make the change by 2010. However, 
during the same time period, the political leanings of government 
leaders in many states shifted significantly, albeit in inconsistent 
directions.285 Stare decisis prevents shifts in the common law 
from fluctuating as suddenly as the political leanings of 
government leaders.286 Even with these factors in mind, the 
strongly positive association between political liberalism and 
higher JADI scores is not one we expected. It reinforces our 
conclusions that it is race and region of the country, not political 
ideology, that primarily affect a state’s JADI. 
V. Conclusion 
Even in the twenty-first century, supreme courts in a 
number of states with substantial percentages of 
African-Americans in their largest cities, particularly those in the 
South, continue to follow outmoded substantive doctrines of tort 
law that make it more difficult for personal injury plaintiffs to 
have their cases decided by juries. These tort doctrines are but 
the latest iteration of various means used by courts during the 
past 150 years to keep African-Americans from participating as 
jurors in personal injury cases. Most courts discarded these 
doctrines during the period extending from the mid-1960s 
through the mid-1980s, during the same era when many trial 
                                                                                                     
 285. See Fording, supra note 282 (charting each state’s NOMINATE score 
from 1960 to 2014). For example, the nominate scores became greater, 
representing a move toward a more liberal electorate, from 1980 to 2010, for 
Illinois (from 50.05 to 85.78) and Virginia (from 44.62 to 57.60), but Florida’s 
NOMINATE scores become significantly less (71.07 to 16.82), representing a 
shift in a conservative direction. 
 286. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 3–5 
(1982) (describing “the incremental nature of common law adjudication”); 
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 25 (1921) 
(characterizing the judicial process as “gradual” and analogizing it to a “moving 
glacier. It goes on inch by inch. Its effects must be measured by decades and 
even centuries”). 
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judges for the first time encountered juries that included 
significant numbers of African-American jurors. However, in a 
minority of predominantly Southern states, appellate court 
judges and sometimes state legislators apparently feared that the 
Bronx jury, or more accurately the Birmingham jury or the 
Baltimore jury, would redistribute wealth or exact retaliation 
against businesses for past racial and economic grievances.  
Twenty-first century state supreme court justices are not 
going to admit that they continue to follow doctrines in order to 
keep juries with substantial numbers of African-American or 
low-income jurors from deciding personal injury cases. Hence, we 
have been able to prove only strong correlations between a state’s 
substantive law that makes it difficult for personal injury 
plaintiffs to have their cases decided by the jury and the factors of 
race and being a part of the South, not causation. Nonetheless, 
these strong correlations, particularly when coupled with the 
historical treatment of African-Americans, most egregiously in 
the South, suggest that these intertwined factors explain the 
continuing observance of doctrines discarded a generation ago by 
the overwhelming majority of other courts.287 
Further, we obviously cannot ascertain whether the 
continuing application of outmoded doctrines that restrict 
plaintiffs’ access to juries that include significant numbers of 
African-Americans is conscious and by design or instead 
represents manifestations of deeply imbedded but unconscious 
racial or class bias. Yet, as described at various points in this 
Article, business leaders, defense counsel, and even some judges 
and legislators have sometimes been quite transparent in 
identifying their concerns that urban juries with 
African-American and low-income jurors are likely to be unfairly 
generous to plaintiffs.  
When courts and legislatures today refuse to reconsider 
anti-plaintiff doctrines such as contributory negligence, 
restrictive rules governing the admissibility of expert testimony, 
                                                                                                     
 287. For example, the only four states that continue to follow the doctrine of 
contributory negligence as a total bar to recovery are states located in the 
traditional South where the population of its leading municipalities, with few 
exceptions, is more than 35% African-American. Infra Appendix B, tbl.3. 
Furthermore, of the eight Southern states in our study, six of them have the 
highest JADIs of all states included in the study. Supra tbl.1. 
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limitations on the liability of charitable institutions, and a wide 
variety of “limited-duty” and “no-duty” rules, they justify their 
decisions with any of several reasons that on their face have 
nothing to do with race. They typically cite stare decisis, the 
principle that judicial lawmaking under the common law begins 
with the presumption that courts will follow judicial precedents 
from an earlier era. However, the precedents that apply to the 
issues we have considered were often decided in the decades 
immediately following the Civil Rights Era when the judgment of 
appellate judges in the South and elsewhere was clouded by their 
apprehension surrounding the then-recent prospect of substantial 
numbers of African-Americans serving on juries for the first time. 
On other occasions, judges resisting a change in law that 
would place them within the modern mainstream of tort law 
assert that overturning anti-jury doctrines would be bad for a 
state’s businesses and would place them at a competitive 
disadvantage with businesses in nearby states.288 These adjoining 
states, of course, are usually other Southern states.289 Perhaps 
most commonly, supreme courts contend that any significant 
change in the law should be enacted by the legislature.290 
Legislators, in turn, assert that these matters should be left to 
the judiciary.291 However, the question remains why this “passing 
the buck” attitude in both the judicial and the legislative 
                                                                                                     
 288. Cf. Brief of the American Tort Reform Ass’n, et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents at 14, Coleman v. Soccer Ass’n of Columbia, 69 A.3d 1149 
(Md. 2013) (Sept. Term, 2012, No. 9), http://www.chamberlitigation.com/ 
sites/default/files/cases/files/2012/Coleman%20v.%20Soccer%20Association%20 
of%20Columbia%2C%20et%20al.%20%28NCLC%20Amicus%20Brief%29.pdf 
(arguing that “the adoption of comparative fault would hurt the regional 
competitiveness of Maryland businesses . . . since the District of Columbia, 
Virginia, and North Carolina all apply the contributory negligence doctrine”).  
 289. Id.  
 290. See, e.g., Golden v. McCurry, 392 So. 2d 815, 817 (Ala. 1980) (holding 
that “this Court . . . should, as a matter of policy, leave any change of the 
doctrine of contributory negligence to the legislature”); Williamson v. Old 
Brogue, Inc., 350 S.E.2d 621, 623 (Va. 1986) (refusing to adopt dramshop 
liability and explaining, “we believe that a decision . . . to abrogate such a 
fundamental rule . . . is the function of the legislative . . . branch of 
government”). 
 291. See Gifford & Robinette, supra note 89, at 718 (reporting that Maryland 
legislators who refused to legislatively abrogate the doctrine of contributory 
negligence stated that “this is a matter for the courts to decide”).  
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branches is so much stronger in some—disproportionately 
Southern—states than in others. 
What are the normative implications of our analysis for state 
supreme courts, particularly those in the South? Courts in states 
that are among the discrete minority that declined to throw out 
antiquated anti-jury substantive tort doctrines between the mid-
1960s and the mid-1980s should acknowledge that these 
precedents are tainted by their predecessors’ efforts to keep tort 
cases away from juries with substantial numbers of 
African-Americans. In a recent and provocative article, Professor 
Barzun argues that placing a past judicial decision in its 
historical context “is a legitimate . . . means of evaluating a 
decision’s authority as a matter of precedent.”292 He further 
contends that it is proper for courts to “explain away whole lines 
of . . . past doctrine as a product of social, political, or economic 
forces.”293  
Considering the racially biased roots of the perpetuation of 
doctrines that keep tort victims from the jury would not be 
unprecedented. For example, when the Supreme Court declared a 
Chicago anti-loitering statute unconstitutional in 1999, it rejected 
the City’s argument that the fact that such “ordinances have long 
existed in this country” implied that they were constitutional.294 
The Court turned the City’s argument on its head and noted that 
“vagrancy laws were used after the Civil War to keep former 
slaves in a state of quasi slavery” and “had especially harmful 
consequences on African-American women and children.”295 
Similarly, in Mitchell v. Helms,296 the Court rejected an 
Establishment Clause challenge to the expenditure of federal 
funds for books and other educational supplies for schools, 
including religious schools. Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, 
explicitly “disavowe[d]” the “shameful pedigree” of the Court’s 
past practice of considering, in its constitutional analysis, 
whether federal funds had aided schools that were “sectarian,” 
                                                                                                     
 292. Charles L. Barzun, Impeaching Precedent, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1625, 1631 
(2013). 
 293. Id. at 1680.  
 294. See Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 59 (1999) (discussing further the 
vagueness of the ordinance). 
 295. Id. at 54 n.20. 
 296. 530 U.S. 793 (2000). 
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noting that the use of this term “arose at a time of pervasive 
hostility to the Catholic Church and to Catholics in general, and 
it was an open secret that ‘sectarian’ was code for ‘Catholic.’”297 
So it is that the tort doctrines described in this Article that 
impede the plaintiff’s access to the jury are code for keeping tort 
cases from African-American juries. Past judicial decisions that 
followed these antiquated tort doctrines, infused with the racial 
biases of a past era, should not be entitled to the deference 
generally accorded precedents. The common law preserves the 
wisdom of the past.298 It should not, however, perpetuate the sins 
of the Jim Crow era.  
  
                                                                                                     
 297. Id. at 828.  
 298. See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira, The Transmission of Legal Precedent: A 
Study of State Supreme Courts, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 178, 183 (1985) 
(characterizing the common law as “the collective and collected wisdom amassed 
over decades[] of an appellate bench”). 
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Appendix 
In this Appendix, we calculate the JADI for each of the 
seventeen states in our study.299 We assign a score to each state 
on each issue ranging from 5, representing the greatest impact in 
denying access to juries, to 0, little or no impact in denying access 
to juries. When a state’s law represents an intermediate position 
or is ambiguous, we exercised our judgment in assessing the 
anti-jury impact. Our guidelines for assessing the anti-jury 
impact of a state’s choice on the five issues follow.  
A. The Choice Between Contributory Negligence and Comparative 
Fault300 
Anti-jury value assigned to contributory negligence states:  5 
Anti-jury value assigned to modified comparative fault states: 1 
Anti-jury value assigned to pure comparative fault states:  0 
B. Limited-Duty Rules in Premises Liability Cases  
The 5 possible points were allocated as follows: 
(1) States that continue to recognize a difference between the 
standard of care owed to licensees and invitees were allocated 
3 points.301 States that have abolished the distinction were 
allocated 0 points.302  
                                                                                                     
 299. Alabama, Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, and Washington. 
 300. Compare, e.g., ALA. R. CIV. P. 8(c) (noting that contributory negligence is 
an affirmative defense barring a plaintiff from recovery), with KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 411.182 (West 2015) (adopting pure comparative fault where a plaintiff’s 
recovery is limited only by percentage of fault). 
 301. See, e.g., McMullan v. Butler, 346 So. 2d 950, 951 (Ala. 1977) (refusing 
to abolish distinction between standard of care owed to invitees and to 
licensees).  
 302. See, e.g., 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 130/2 (2014) (abolishing the distinction 
between the duty of care owed to invitees and to licensees). 
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(2) States retaining the “landlord out of possession” defense or 
its functional equivalent were awarded 1 point.303 States that 
have abrogated the doctrine were allocated 0 points.304  
(3) States recognizing the “open and obvious danger” exception 
to liability as a matter of law were awarded 1 point.305 States 
without the doctrine were allocated 0 points.306  
(4) In some instances, states follow an intermediate position or 
a hybrid position on any of these issues. When a state follows 
an intermediate position on either the “landlord out of 
possession” issue (paragraph 2) or the “open and obvious 
danger” issue (paragraph 3), we assigned a value of 0.5 points.  
C. Other No-Duty and Limited-Duty Doctrines 
No-duty and limited-duty doctrines arise in a variety of 
contexts that are fact-specific and vary from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction.307 To achieve some degree of consistency, we selected 
three examples of no-duty rules on which most state supreme 
courts have taken a position: 
(1) Dramshop Liability.308 We allocated 2 points to states that 
do not recognize dramshop liability. If a state recognizes 
dramshop liability but only in tightly constricted 
circumstances, we allocated 1 point. If a state recognizes a 
                                                                                                     
 303. See, e.g., Frobig v. Gordon, 881 P.2d 226, 228 (Wash. 1994) (“[T]he 
general rule is that a landlord is not responsible . . . for conditions which 
develop . . . after possession has been transferred.”).  
 304. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 357 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“A 
lessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his lessee and 
others . . . by a condition of disrepair . . . .”). 
 305. See, e.g., Lorinovich v. K Mart Corp., 516 S.E.2d 643, 646 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1999) (“When a reasonable occupier of land should anticipate that a dangerous 
condition will likely cause physical harm to the lawful visitor, notwithstanding 
its known and obvious danger, the occupier of the land is not absolved from 
liability.”). 
 306. See, e.g., Gottlieb v. Andrus, 104 S.E.2d 743, 746 (Va. 1958) (holding 
that land possessor is not liable for open and obvious hazards). 
 307.  See Dilan A. Esper & Gregory C. Keating, Abusing “Duty,” 79 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 265, 272 (2006) (describing an “incipient trend . . . characterized by a 
proliferation of highly particular determinations of ‘no duty’”). 
 308. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-71(a) (2015) (providing a cause of action for 
any “person who shall be injured” against “any person who shall, by selling, 
giving or otherwise disposing of to another . . . any liquors or beverages”). 
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more typical and expansive level of dramshop liability, we 
awarded 0 points.  
(2) Liability of Mental Health Provider to Third Party.309 If a 
state does not recognize a duty of care owed to a third party 
harmed by a patient of a mental health provider, we allocated 
up to 1.5 points. We awarded a state either 0.5 or 1.0 points if 
liability is possible, but only in circumstances significantly 
more restricted than those articulated in Tarasoff v. Regents of 
the University of California.310 If the state recognizes a more 
typical standard for imposing liability, the state was allocated 
0 points.  
(3) Liability of the State for Harm Inflicted by Probationer or 
Parolee.311 If a state does not recognize a duty of care owed by 
the state to a third party harmed by a parolee or probationer, 
the state was allocated up to 1.5 points. If the potential for 
liability is present, but significantly more restricted than in 
other states recognizing such liability, the state was awarded 
either 1.0 or 0.5 points. If the state recognizes the more typical 
standard for liability for the state, the state was allocated 0 
points.  
We allocate fewer points for the mental health provider and 
the parole/probation subcategories than for dramshop liability 
because the holdings of state courts on the first two issues often 
overlap and mirror each other. For each state, the point totals for 
paragraphs 1–3 above are summed to determine a state’s jury 
access denial points on the issue of “Other No Duty or Limited 
Duty Liability Rules.” 
                                                                                                     
 309. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 330.1946 (2015) (establishing a duty on the 
part of a mental health professional whose patient makes a threat “against a 
reasonably identifiable third person” and “has the apparent intent and ability to 
carry out that threat in the foreseeable future”).  
 310. See Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 341 (Cal. 
1976) (“When a therapist determines . . . that his patient presents a serious 
danger of violence to another, he incurs an obligation to use reasonable care to 
protect the intended victim against such danger.”). 
 311. See, e.g., Taggart v. State, 822 P.2d 243, 257 (Wash. 1992) (“[P]arole 
officers have a duty to protect others from reasonably foreseeable dangers 
engendered by parolees’ dangerous propensities.”). 
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D. Standards for Admissibility of Expert Testimony312 
We assigned each state a value of 0 to 5. A value of 5 
represents the most restrictive tests for the admission of expert 
scientific testimony—usually states following Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharms., Inc.313 A value of 0 represents the least restrictive 
tests—usually states following Frye v. United States.314 
E. Limitations on the Liability of Charitable Institutions315 
A state is assigned a value of 0 if it has entirely abrogated 
the doctrine of charitable immunity. The more limitations a state 
imposes on the liability of charitable institutions, the higher the 
score allocated, with a maximum score of 5.  
  
                                                                                                     
 312. Compare, e.g., Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 372 (Md. 1978) (following 
Frye), with State v. Bernstein, 349 P.3d 200, 202–04 (Ariz. 2015) (applying 
amended Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 and the Daubert standard it 
incorporates). 
 313. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 314. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 315. See, e.g., MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-632 (West 2015) (providing that a 
charitable hospital or related institution is not liable beyond the excess of its 
liability insurance policy as long it is insured for at least $100,000). 
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 317. See Williams v. Delta Int’l Mach. Corp., 619 So. 2d 1330, 1333 (Ala. 
1993) (“[T]he majority of this Court, for various reasons, has decided that we 
should not abandon the doctrine of contributory negligence, which has been the 
law in Alabama for approximately 162 years.”); ALA. R. CIV. P. 8(c) (noting that 
contributory negligence is an affirmative defense). 
 318. See McMullan v. Butler, 346 So. 2d 950, 951 (Ala. 1977) (refusing to 
abolish the distinction between the standard of care owed to invitees and to 
licensees).  
 319. See Allen v. Genry, 97 So. 2d 828, 831 (Ala. Ct. App. 1957) (recognizing 
landlord out-of-possession doctrine with traditional exceptions, such as 
knowledge and concealment). 
 320. See Tice v. Tice, 361 So. 2d 1051, 1052 (Ala. 1978) (holding that the 
premises owner “has no duty to warn . . . of open and obvious defects . . . which 
the invitee is aware of, or should be aware of, in the exercise of reasonable 
care”). 
 321. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-71(a) (LexisNexis 2015) (providing for dramshop 
liability). 
 322. See Donahoo v. State, 479 So. 2d 1188, 1190–91 (Ala. 1985) (stating 
that liability would exist if the plaintiff is able to “prove that the officials knew 
or should have known that an aggressor might be a danger to a . . . readily 
identifiable victim or group of victims” (citations omitted)), overruled in part by 
Ryan v. Hayes, 831 So. 2d 21, 30 (Ala. 2002) (narrowing Donahoo rule to parole 
officials rather than all state officials). 
 323. See Morton v. Prescott, 564 So. 2d 913, 916 (Ala. 1990) (acknowledging 
the possibility of liability only where there is a “specific threat of harm to the 
victim or to any identifiable group of which the victim might have been a 
member”).  
 324. See Autry v. Roebuck Park Baptist Church, 229 So. 2d 469, 470 (Ala. 
1969) (declining to dismiss action against church on charitable immunity 
grounds); Ala. Baptist Hosp. Bd. v. Carter, 145 So. 443, 445 (Ala. 1932) 
(declining to apply charitable immunity to a charitable hospital for a claim by a 
paying patient); see also ALLY W. HOWELL, 1 ALA. PERS. INJ. & TORTS § 3:20 
(2014) (“In Alabama, however, the judicially created doctrine of charitable 
immunity is basically dead or at least in great decline.”). 
 325. See ALA. CODE § 12-21-160 ed.’s note (LexisNexis 2015) (adopting the 
Daubert standard with exceptions).  
 326. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-2505 (LexisNexis 2015) (providing for 
comparative fault). 
 327. See Nicoletti v. Westcor, Inc., 639 P.2d 330, 332 (Ariz. 1982) (“The 
particular duty owed to the entrant on the land is defined by the entrant's 
status.”). 
 328. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1325 (removing landlord liability to tenant if 
the property is sold and the tenant is notified of the sale).  
 329. See Tribe v. Shell Oil Co., 652 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Ariz. 1982) (rejecting 
the open-and-obvious hazard doctrine). 
 330. See Ontiveros v. Borak, 667 P.2d 200, 213 (Ariz. 1983) (noting that “the 
common law doctrine of tavern owner nonliability is abolished in Arizona”). But 
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see Schwab v. Matley, 793 P.2d 1088, 1091–92 (Ariz. 1990) (stating that the jury 
may consider defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk when 
the victim was present when the driver consumed alcohol). 
 331. See Grimm v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 564 P.2d 1227, 1235 
(Ariz. 1977) (recognizing liability only if the parole board is “grossly negligent or 
reckless”). 
 332. See Hamman v. Cnty. of Maricopa, 775 P.2d 1122, 1128 (Ariz. 1989) 
(recognizing duty of psychiatrists “to protect the foreseeable victim”). 
 333. See Ray v. Tucson Med. Ctr., 230 P.2d 220, 230 (Ariz. 1951) 
(“[C]haritable institutions are liable for the torts of their servants from which 
injury proximately results to a third person, whether stranger or patient and 
whether the patient is a paying or nonpaying patient.”). 
 334. See State v. Bernstein, 349 P.3d 200, 202–04 (Ariz. 2015) (applying 
amended Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 and the Daubert standard it 
incorporates). 
 335. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1242 (Cal. 1975) (adopting 
pure comparative fault). 
 336. See Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 568 (Cal. 1968) (overturning 
traditional classification system and imposing general standard of reasonable 
care), superseded in part by statute CAL. CIV. CODE § 847 (West 2015), as 
recognized in Calvillo-Silva v. Home Grocery, 968 P.2d 65, 71–72 (Cal. 1998) 
(recognizing limited liability for possessors of land against an individual 
committing a felony on the land).  
 337. See Lopez v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 821, 827 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1996) (“[A] lessor out of possession must exercise due care and must act 
reasonably toward the tenant as well as to unknown third persons.”). 
 338. See Martinez v. Chippewa Enters., Inc., 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 152, 155 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2004) (“[T]the obviousness of a condition does not necessarily excuse 
the potential duty of a landowner.”).  
 339. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714 (“[T]he furnishing of alcoholic beverages is 
not the proximate cause of injuries resulting from intoxication.”); CAL. BUS. & 
PROF. CODE § 25602.1 (West 2015) (eliminating causes of action for dramshop 
liability except if licensed seller or social host serves alcoholic beverages “to a 
person whom he or she knows, or should have known, to be under 21 years of 
age”), abrogating Vesely v. Sager, 486 P.2d 151 (Cal. 1971). 
 340. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 845.8 (West 2015) (providing that neither the 
government nor a public employee is liable for injury caused by parolee); 
Whitcombe v. Cnty. of Yolo, 141 Cal. Rptr. 189, 200 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (noting 
that public policy supports rejecting public-employee liability for injury caused 
by parolee).  
 341. See Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 353 (Cal. 
1976) (concluding that government-employed therapists must act “pursuant to 
the standards of their profession” or face liability for duty breaches); CAL. CIV. 
CODE § 43.92 (providing for liability where “the patient has communicated to the 
psychotherapist a serious threat of physical violence against a reasonably 
identifiable victim or victims”).  
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 342. See Malloy v. Fong, 232 P.2d 241, 247 (Cal. 1951) (“[C]haritable 
corporations are liable . . . whether or not a particular plaintiff has paid for the 
charity received.”).   
 343. See People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244 (Cal. 1976) (following Frye).  
 344. See FLA. STAT. § 768.81(2) (2015) (codifying, with modifications, 
Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973) and providing for pure comparative 
fault). 
 345. See Wood v. Camp, 284 So. 2d 691, 695 (Fla. 1973) (eliminating 
distinction between duty of care owed to invitees and “licensees by invitation” 
and imposing a general negligence standard).  
 346. See Mansur v. Eubanks, 401 So. 2d 1328, 1330 (Fla. 1981) (“[The 
landlord] has a continuing duty to exercise reasonable care to repair dangerous 
defective conditions upon notice of their existence.”). 
 347. See Aaron v. Palatka Mall, LLC, 908 So. 2d 574, 578 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2005) (noting that liability depends on “whether . . . the owner or possessor 
should have anticipated that the dangerous condition would cause injury despite 
the fact it was open and obvious”). 
 348. See FLA. STAT. § 768.125 (2015) (establishing liability only where patron 
is a minor or “a person habitually addicted to . . . the use of . . . alcoholic 
beverages”). 
 349. See Berry v. State, 400 So. 2d 80, 85–86 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) 
(concluding that the state is not liable for negligent parole decisions under the 
state torts claims act). 
 350. See Boynton v. Burglass, 590 So. 2d 446, 451 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) 
(“[I]t would be fundamentally unfair to charge a psychiatrist with the duty to 
warn.”). 
 351. See Nicholson v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 199 So. 344, 350 (Fla. 1940) 
(abrogating charitable immunity).  
 352. See Bundy v. State, 471 So. 2d 9, 18 (Fla. 1985) (continuing to apply the 
Frye test). 
 353. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1116 (c) (2014) (adopting, in 1984, modified 
comparative fault). 
 354. See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 130/2 (abolishing, in 1983, the distinction 
between duty of care owed to invitee and to licensee).  
 355. See Howle v. Aqua Ill., Inc., 978 N.E.2d 1132, 1143 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) 
(acknowledging the landlord out-of-possession doctrine with exceptions). 
 356. See Bucheleres v. Chi. Park Dist., 665 N.E.2d 826, 831–32 (Ill. 1996) 
(following open-and-obvious hazard doctrine). 
 357. See 235 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6-21 (providing for dramshop liability of 
those licensed to sell “alcoholic liquors”).  
 358. See Nat’l Bank of Bloomington v. State, 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. 37, 41 (1982) 
(finding state liable to estate of victim murdered by parolee through negligence 
of parole officer).  
 359. See Eckhardt v. Kirts, 534 N.E.2d 1339, 1344 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) 
(requiring for liability that “[f]irst, the patient must make specific threat(s) of 
violence; second, the threat(s) must be directed at a specific and identified 
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victim; and third, a direct physician-patient relationship between the doctor and 
the plaintiff or a special relationship between the patient and the plaintiff”). 
 360. See Darling v. Charleston Cmty. Mem’l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253, 260 (Ill. 
1965) (abrogating charitable immunity). 
 361. See People v. Miller, 670 N.E.2d 721, 731 (Ill. 1996) (applying Frye), 
abrogated by In re Commitment of Simons, 821 N.E.2d 1184, 1189–90 (Ill. 2004) 
(requiring de novo review of a trial court’s Frye analysis). 
 362. See IND. CODE ANN. § 34-51-2-6 (adopting modified comparative fault). 
 363. See Barbre v. Indianapolis Water Co., 400 N.E.2d 1142, 1145 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1980) (recognizing traditional distinctions of invitee, licensee, or 
trespasser). 
 364. See Dickison v. Hargitt, 611 N.E.2d 691, 694 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) 
(recognizing “caveat lessee” doctrine with traditional exceptions).  
 365. See Smith v. Baxter, 796 N.E.2d 242, 246 (Ind. 2003) (allowing the jury 
to consider liability despite open and obvious nature of hazard). 
 366. See IND. CODE ANN. § 7.1-5-10-15.5 (West 2015) (requiring, for liability, 
“actual knowledge that the person to whom the alcoholic beverage was 
furnished was visibly intoxicated”).  
 367. Cf. Klobuchar v. Purdue Univ., 553 N.E.2d 169, 171 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1990) (stating that “civil liability of a governmental unit may not be predicated 
upon a duty owed to the public generally” (quoting State v. Flanigan, 489 
N.E.2d 1216 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986))). 
 368. See IND. CODE ANN. § 34-30-16-1 (West 2015) (providing for liability 
when a mental health patient communicates an “actual threat of physical 
violence . . . against a reasonably identifiable victim or victims, or evidences 
conduct or makes statements indicating an imminent danger that the patient 
will use physical violence” against others).   
 369. See Harris v. YWCA, 237 N.E.2d 242, 245 (Ind. 1968) (“[T]he duty of 
this Court is to repudiate the doctrine of charitable immunity and . . . it is 
hereby abolished by this Court.”). 
 370. See Steward v. State, 652 N.E.2d 490, 498 (Ind. 1995) (concluding that 
Daubert is not binding, but helpful in applying Indiana Rule of Evidence 702(b)). 
 371. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a(a) (2014) (adopting modified 
comparative fault under which plaintiff cannot recover if her degree of fault is 
equal to or exceeds that of the combined defendants).  
 372. See Jones v. Hansen, 867 P.2d 303, 310 (Kan. 1994) (“[T]he duty owed 
by an occupier of land to licensees shall no longer be dependent upon the status 
of the entrant on the land.”). 
 373. See Colombel v. Milan, 952 P.2d 941, 943 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998) (“[W]hen 
a landlord is not in possession of the leased property, he or she has a very 
limited duty to the tenant or to third persons entering the land for defective 
conditions existing thereon.”). 
 374. See Miller v. Zep Mfg. Co., 815 P.2d 506, 514 (Kan. 1991) 
(acknowledging a general open and obvious rule, but providing for an exception 
“if there is reason to expect an invitee will be distracted”).  
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 375. See Ling v. Jan’s Liquors, 703 P.2d 731, 735–36, 739 (Kan. 1985) 
(noting that there is no dramshop act in Kansas and concluding that there is no 
dramshop liability on grounds of both no duty and proximate cause).  
 376. See Beck v. Kan. Adult Auth., 735 P.2d 222, 238 (Kan. 1987) 
(explaining that parole and probation decisions are discretionary acts immune 
from liability under the state tort claims act).   
 377. Compare Boulanger v. Pol, 900 P.2d 823, 836 (Kan. 1995) (holding that 
there was no duty of care owed to victim harmed by “alleged negligent release of 
a voluntary patient . . . [and] no duty to warn”), with Durflinger v. Artiles, 673 
P.2d 86, 99–100 (Kan. 1983) (recognizing claim for negligent release of an 
involuntarily committed dangerous patient “as distinguished from negligent 
failure to warn persons who might be injured by the patient as a result of the 
release”).  
 378. See Noel v. Menninger Found., 267 P.2d 934, 943 (Kan. 1954) (holding 
that “charitable institutions are liable for the torts . . . to a third person, 
whether stranger or patient, and whether the patient is a paying or nonpaying 
patient”).  
 379. See State v. Heath, 957 P.2d 449, 464 (Kan. 1998) (following Frye).  
 380. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.182 (West 2015) (adopting, in 1988, 
comparative fault); see also Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713, 720 (Ky. 1984) 
(replacing contributory negligence with pure comparative fault).  
 381. See Perry v. Williamson, 824 S.W.2d 869, 875 (Ky. 1992)  
The injured party’s status as trespasser, licensee, or invitee, is an 
important factor in determining whether the possessor of land has 
exercised reasonable care, but such status is by no means the end of 
the inquiry. An enlightened legal system does not reason backward 
from labels, to decide whether a duty of reasonable care exits. It 
reasons forward from circumstances, using foreseeability, the gravity 
of the potential harm, and the possessor’s right to control his 
property, to decide what is reasonable conduct in the circumstances 
and what is negligence. 
 382. See Milby v. Mears, 580 S.W.2d 724, 728 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (“The 
landlord need not exercise even ordinary care to furnish reasonably safe 
premises, and he is not generally liable for injuries caused by defects therein.”). 
 383. See Shelton v. Ky. Easter Seals Soc’y, Inc., 413 S.W.3d 901, 907 (Ky. 
2013) (“[T]he existence of an open and obvious danger does not pertain to the 
existence of duty. . . . [A] land possessor’s general duty of care is not eliminated 
because of the obviousness of the danger.”).  
 384. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.241 (allowing liability only where patron 
is a minor or where “a reasonable person under the same or similar 
circumstances should know that the person served is already intoxicated”). 
 385. See Moore v. Commonwealth, 846 S.W.2d 715, 716–17 (Ky. 1992) 
(finding no liability because the state tort claims act does not waive immunity 
for regulatory acts that “have no equivalent in the private sector”).  
 386. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202A.400 (West 2015) (establishing liability 
where “the patient has communicated to the mental health professional an 
actual threat of physical violence against a clearly identified or reasonably 
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identifiable victim, or . . . an actual threat of some specific violent act [even if no 
particular victim is identifiable]”).  
 387. See Mullikin v. Jewish Hosp. Ass’n of Louisville, 348 S.W.2d 930, 935 
(Ky. 1961) (abrogating charitable immunity and eliminating distinctions 
between paying and nonpaying patients). 
 388. See Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 908 S.W.2d 100, 101 (Ky. 1995) 
(adopting Daubert standard), overruled in part on other grounds by Fugate v. 
Commonwealth, 993 S.W.2d 931 (Ky. 1999). 
 389. See Coleman v. Soccer Ass’n of Columbia, 69 A.3d 1149, 1150 (Md. 
2013) (maintaining contributory negligence as a bar to recovery); Harrison v. 
Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Educ., 456 A.2d 894, 898 (Md. 1983) (“[I]t [is] the 
well-Sestablished law of this State that a plaintiff who fails to observe ordinary 
care for his own safety is contributorily negligent and is barred from all 
recovery, regardless of the quantum of a defendant’s primary negligence.”).  
 390. See Bramble v. Thompson, 287 A.2d 265, 267 (Md. 1972) (“The liability 
of owners of real . . . property to an individual injured on their property is 
dependent on . . . whether he is an invitee, licensee, or trespasser.”).  
 391. See Matthews v. Amberwood Assocs. Ltd., 719 A.2d 119, 124 (Md. 1998) 
(recognizing the landlord out-of-possession doctrine with traditional exceptions).  
 392. See Tennant v. Shoppers Food Warehouse Md. Corp., 693 A.2d 370, 374 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997) (“[T]he owner or occupier of land ordinarily has no 
duty to warn . . . of an open, obvious, and present danger.”). 
 393. See Warr v. JMGM Grp., LLC, 70 A.3d 347, 355 (Md. 2013) (rejecting 
dramshop liability by stating that tavern owners have no control over 
individuals in the absence of a special relationship and thus owe no duty to 
third persons).  
 394. See Lamb v. Hopkins, 492 A.2d 1297, 1299, 1306 (Md. 1985) (concluding 
that probation officers owed “no duty” to victim of probationer who repeatedly 
drove while intoxicated in violation of conditions of probation).   
 395. See MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-609(b) (West 2015) 
(establishing liability of “mental health provider . . . [who] knew of the patient’s 
propensity for violence” only when “the patient indicated to the mental health 
care provider . . . the patient’s intention to inflict imminent physical injury upon 
a specified victim or group of victims”).  
 396. See id. § 5-632 (adopted 1990) (providing that a charitable hospital or 
related institution is not liable beyond the excess of its liability insurance policy 
as long it is insured for at least $100,000); Howard v. Bishop Byrne Council 
Home, Inc., 238 A.2d 863, 868 (Md. 1967) (declining to overturn doctrine of 
charitable immunity). 
 397. See Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 372 (Md. 1978) (following Frye). 
 398. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85 (2015) (adopted 1969) (adopting 
modified comparative fault where plaintiff cannot recover if her degree of fault 
exceeds that of the combined defendants). 
 399. See Mounsey v. Ellard, 297 N.E.2d 43, 51 (Mass. 1973) (overturning 
“the common law distinction between licensees and invitees and . . . creat[ing] 
a . . . duty of reasonable care which the occupier owes to all lawful visitors”). 
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 400. See Young v. Garwacki, 402 N.E.2d 1045, 1050–51 (Mass. 1980) (“[T]he 
landlord is liable in negligence for defects of which he has notice, even though 
the defect occurs on the rented premises.”).  
 401. See Dos Santos v. Coleta, 987 N.E.2d 1187, 1192 (Mass. 2013) 
(explaining that “[a] landowner . . . is not relieved from remedying an open and 
obvious danger where [the landowner] ‘can and should anticipate that the 
dangerous condition will cause physical harm to the [lawful visitor] 
notwithstanding its known or obvious danger’” (alteration in original) (quoting 
Papadopoulos v. Target Corp., 930 N.E.2d 142, 151 (Mass. 2010))).  
 402. See Cimino v. Milford Keg, Inc., 431 N.E.2d 920, 926 (Mass. 1982) 
(finding tavern liable for serving alcohol to an individual who subsequently 
struck “a highway traveler” with a vehicle); Adamian v. Three Sons, Inc., 233 
N.E.2d 18, 20 (Mass. 1968) (noting that a restaurant is liable for selling alcohol 
to intoxicated patron). 
 403. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, § 10(i) (providing for no liability against 
parole or probation authorities under state torts claims act except for instances 
of gross negligence).  
 404. See id. ch. 123, § 36B (providing for liability against mental health 
professionals only under highly specific circumstances). 
 405. See id. ch. 231, § 85K (limiting liability of nonprofit organization for 
medical malpractice claims to $100,000 and for other claims to $20,000, 
provided that the tort occurs in the course of activities not “primarily 
commercial”).  
 406. See Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 641 N.E.2d 1342, 1349 (Mass. 1994) 
(adopting the Daubert standard). 
 407. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2959 (providing for pure comparative fault 
except that plaintiff cannot recover noneconomic damages if plaintiff’s degree of 
fault is greater than that of the other parties); Placek v. City of Sterling 
Heights, 275 N.W.2d 511, 520 (Mich. 1979) (adopting pure comparative 
negligence). 
 408. See Stitt v. Holland Abundant Life Fellowship, 614 N.W.2d 88, 91–92 
(Mich. 2000) (following traditional classification of land visitors).  
 409. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Thorn, 258 N.W.2d 30, 33–34 (Mich. 1977) 
(overturning previous case law recognizing landlord-out-of-possession doctrine).   
 410. See Riddle v. McLouth Steel Prods. Corp., 485 N.W.2d 676, 682 (Mich. 
1992) (noting that the open and obvious nature of a hazard does not preclude 
land possessor’s duty, and the duty owed is up to the jury).  
 411. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 436.1801(3) (providing for liability of licensee 
serving alcohol to a minor or visibly intoxicated person where “the unlawful sale 
is proven to be a proximate cause” of the injury or death). 
 412. See Harrison v. Dir. of Dep’t of Corr., 487 N.W.2d 799, 806–07 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 1992) (finding no duty because no special relationship existed and 
concluding that the parole board is not liable under state tort claims act).   
 413. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 330.1946 (2015) (establishing a duty on the 
part of a mental health professional whose patient makes a threat “against a 
reasonably identifiable third person” and “has the apparent intent and ability to 
carry out that threat in the foreseeable future”).  
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 414. See Parker v. Port Huron Hosp., 105 N.W.2d 1, 15 (Mich. 1960) 
(“[C]haritable, nonprofit hospital organization[s] should no longer be held 
immune from liability for injuries to patients caused by the negligence of its 
employees.”). 
 415. See MICH. R. EVID. 702 (explicitly incorporating the Daubert standard); 
see also Gilbert v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 685 N.W.2d 391, 408 (Mich. 2004) 
(recognizing incorporation of the Daubert standard). 
 416. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.1 (West 2015) (abrogating contributory 
negligence as a bar to recovery and adopting modified comparative negligence).  
 417.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM  
§ 51 cmt a, rptrs’ note (AM. LAW INST. 2012) (characterizing this approach as 
“hybrid”); see also Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 625 A.2d 1110, 1115 (N.J. 
1993) (rejecting the traditional classification approach to liability). But see 
Robinson v. Vivirito, 86 A.3d 119, 124 (N.J. 2014) (stating that “the existence of 
a duty by a landowner to exercise reasonable care to third persons is generally 
governed by the status of the third person—guest, invitee, or trespasser”); 
Clohesy v. Food Circus Supermarkets, 694 A.2d 1017, 1027 (N.J. 1997) (stating 
that the status of the land visitor supports the court’s determination of the level 
of care owed by the defendant). 
 418. See Geringer v. Hartz Mountain Dev. Corp., 908 A.2d 837, 845 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) (finding landlord potentially liable for negligently 
designed stairway within leased premises, even though tenant had primary role 
in constructing stairway).   
 419. See Siddons v. Cook, 887 A.2d 689, 694 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) 
(implying that there is no duty to warn if hazard is “open and obvious”); see also 
Bussie v. Bloom Org., No. L-3593-03, 2007 WL 1425493, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. May 16, 2007) (stating that there is no liability where danger was 
open and obvious).  
 420. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:22A-5 (establishing dramshop liability).  
 421. See Coppola v. State, 424 A.2d 858, 859–60 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1981) (applying N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:5-2(a), which provides no liability for parole 
decisions).  
 422. See McIntosh v. Milano, 403 A.2d 500, 511–12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1979) (“[A] psychiatrist or therapist may have a duty . . . to protect an intended 
or potential victim of his patient when he determines, or should 
determine . . . that the patient is or may present a probability of danger to that 
person.”).  
 423. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-7 (West 2015) (providing immunity for 
nonprofit organization against claims brought by beneficiaries); id. § 2A:53A-8 
(limiting liability of nonprofit hospital corporation to beneficiary to $250,000).  
 424. See Rubanick v. Witco Chem. Corp., 593 A.2d 733, 747–48 (N.J. 1991) 
(holding that “a scientific theory of causation that has not yet reached general 
acceptance may be found to be sufficiently reliable if it is based on a sound, 
adequately-founded scientific methodology involving data and information of the 
type reasonably relied on by experts in the scientific field”).  
 425. See Corns v. Hall, 435 S.E.2d 88, 90 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (“The doctrine 
of contributory negligence has been followed in this State since 
1869. . . . Comparative fault is not the law of this State.”). 
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 426. See Nelson v. Freeland, 507 S.E.2d 882, 892 (N.C. 1998) (“[T]his Court 
concludes that we should eliminate the distinction between licensees and 
invitees by requiring a standard of reasonable care toward all lawful visitors.”). 
 427. See Boyer v. Agapion, 264 S.E.2d 364, 367–68 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980) 
(adopting the Second Restatement position that a landlord is liable if he knows 
or “has reason to know” of a hazardous condition and “has reason to expect that 
the tenant will not discover the condition or realize the risk” (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP. § 17.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1977))).  
 428. See Lorinovich v. K Mart Corp., 516 S.E.2d 643, 646 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1999) (“When a reasonable occupier of land should anticipate that a dangerous 
condition will likely cause physical harm to the lawful visitor, notwithstanding 
its known and obvious danger, the occupier of the land is not absolved from 
liability.”). 
 429. See Hall v. Toreros, II, Inc., 626 S.E.2d 861, 865 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) 
(noting that violation of statute “can give rise to an action for negligence against 
the licensee . . . by a member of the public who has been injured by the 
intoxicated customer” (quoting Hutchens v. Hankins, 303 S.E.2d 584, 593 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 1983))) aff’d, 678 S.E.2d 656 (N.C. 2009); Estate of Mullis v. Monroe Oil 
Co., 505 S.E.2d 131, 135 (N.C. 1998) (recognizing common law negligence claim 
against commercial vendor based upon sale of alcohol to underage individual); 
Hart v. Ivey, 420 S.E.2d 174, 178 (N.C. 1992) (recognizing common law 
negligence claim against social host based upon service of alcohol to intoxicated 
individual).    
 430. See Humphries v. N.C. Dep’t of Corrs., 479 S.E.2d 27, 28 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1996) (noting that no duty is owed by the Department of Corrections under 
public duty doctrine for actions of a probationer unless there is a special 
relationship or a special duty). 
 431. See Gregory v. Kilbride, 565 S.E.2d 685, 692 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992) 
(“North Carolina does not recognize a psychiatrist’s duty to warn third 
persons.”). 
 432. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.9 (2014) (abolishing charitable immunity); 
Rabon v. Rowan Mem. Hosp., Inc., 152 S.E.2d 485, 499 (N.C. 1967) (abrogating 
immunity in action against charitable hospital as hospitals are profit centered).   
 433. See State v. Pennington, 393 S.E.2d 847, 852–53 (N.C. 1990) (rejecting 
the Frye standard and substituting one based on indicia of reliability specified 
by court).  
 434. See Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 399 S.E.2d 783, 784 (S.C. 1991) (“[A] 
plaintiff in a negligence action may recover damages if his or her negligence is 
not greater than that of the defendant.”). 
 435. See Singleton v. Sherer, 659 S.E.2d 196, 204 (S.C. Ct. App. 2008) 
(applying traditional classification of visitors to land). 
 436.  See Jackson v. Swordfish Invs., LLC, 620 S.E.2d 54, 56 (S.C. 2005) 
(continuing to recognize “traditional rule” with exceptions for “common areas” 
and “affirmative action”).  
 437. See Callander v. Charleston Doughnut Corp., 406 S.E.2d 361, 362 (S.C. 
1991) (indicating that a land owner may owe a duty despite the open and 
obvious nature of the hazard).  
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 438. See Tobias v. Sports Club, Inc., 504 S.E.2d 318, 320 (S.C. 1998) (“[O]ur 
alcohol control statutes do not create a first party cause of action for an 
intoxicated adult patron, but . . . they do permit a third party action.”). 
 439. See Rayfield v. S.C. Dep’t of Corrs., 374 S.E.2d 910, 916–17 (S.C. 1988) 
(finding that the public-duty rule precluded liability of Parole Board for actions 
of a parolee). 
 440. See Bishop v. S.C. Dep’t of Mental Health, 502 S.E.2d 78, 82 (S.C. 1998) 
(recognizing duty where “defendant [is] aware or should have been aware of the 
specific threat made by the patient to harm a specific person”).  
 441. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-56-180 (2014) (adopted in 1994) (limiting 
liability to amount recoverable under South Carolina Tort Claims Act, S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 15-78-120 ($300,000)), abrogating Fitzer v. Greater Greenville S.C. 
YMCA, 282 S.E.2d 230, 232 (S.C. 1981) (“The doctrine of charitable immunity is 
abolished in its entirety.”).  
 442. See State v. Council, 515 S.E.2d 508, 517–18 (S.C. 1999) (declining to 
adopt the Daubert test, but recognizing that South Carolina Rule of Evidence 
702 is very similar to the corresponding federal rule); State v. Jones, 259 S.E.2d 
120, 124 (S.C. 1979) (identifying factors to be considered by trial court in 
determining admissibility).  
 443. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 33.001, 33.003–.004 (West 
2013) (providing for modified comparative fault where plaintiff is barred from 
recovery if “percentage of responsibility is greater than 50 percent”). 
 444. See Mellon Mortg. Co. v. Holder, 5 S.W.3d 654, 660 (Tex. 1999) (Enoch, 
J., concurring) (stating that the “traditional classification system . . . remains 
the law in Texas”). 
 445. See Brownsville Navigation Dist. v. Izaguirre, 829 S.W.2d 159, 160 
(Tex. 1992) (retaining the landlord out-of-possession doctrine with exceptions). 
 446. See Parker v. Highland Park, Inc., 565 S.W.2d 512, 517 (Tex. 1978) 
(expressly abolishing the no-duty concept in the case of open and obvious 
hazards).  
 447. See El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306, 314 (Tex. 1987) (“We hold 
an alcoholic beverage licensee owes a duty to the general public not to serve 
alcoholic beverages to a person when the licensee knows or should know patron 
is intoxicated.”), superseded by statute, TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. §§ 2.01–03 
(West 2015) (recognizing liability when patron is “obviously intoxicated” and 
“present[s] a clear danger to himself and others”).  
 448. See Harrison v. Tex. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 895 S.W.2d 807, 809 
(Tex. 1995) (finding no liability under Texas torts claims act).  
 449. See Williams v. Sun Valley Hosp., 723 S.W.2d 783, 809 (Tex. App. 1987) 
(accepting Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 
1976), but finding no liability “[w]here there is no allegation of a threat or 
danger to a readily identifiable person”); see also Kerrville State Hosp. v. Clark, 
900 S.W.2d 425, 436 n.13 (Tex. App. 1995) (finding that “a threat need not be 
made against a specific victim in order for the duty to warn to be imposed”), 
rev’d on other grounds, 932 S.W.2d 582, 589 (Tex. 1996). 
 450. Although the Texas Supreme Court judicially abolished charitable 
immunity in Howle v. Camp Amon Carter, 470 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1971), the 
legislature enacted the Charitable Immunity and Liability Act, placing limits on 
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tort liability. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 84.001, .006 (West 2013) 
(limiting liability of a nonhospital charitable organization to $500,000 and 
essentially limiting liability to a nonpaying hospital patient to $500,000); see 
also TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 311.0456 (West 2015) (limiting liability for 
noneconomic damages of nonprofit hospitals providing substantial amounts of 
charitable care).  
 451. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 556 
(Tex. 1995) (“We are persuaded by the reasoning in Daubert.”). 
 452. See Litchford v. Hancock, 352 S.E.2d 335, 337 (Va. 1987) (“[A]ny 
negligence of a plaintiff . . . will bar a recovery.”) 
 453. See Appalachian Power Co. v. LaForce, 201 S.E.2d 768, 770 (Va. 1974) 
(following traditional trichotomy approach).  
 454. See Oliver v. Cashin, 65 S.E.2d 571, 572–73 (Va. 1951) (recognizing the 
non-liability doctrine with traditional exceptions).  
 455. See Gottlieb v. Andrus, 104 S.E.2d 743, 746 (Va. 1958) (explaining that 
the land possessor is not liable for open and obvious hazards). 
 456. See Williamson v. Old Brogue, Inc., 350 S.E.2d 621, 625 (Va. 1986) 
(stating that violation of a statute does not create a duty owed to a member of 
the public and recognizing that a common law action against supplier of 
intoxicating beverages fails because the supplier’s actions are not a proximate 
cause of the victim’s injury or death). 
 457. See Fox v. Custis, 372 S.E.2d 373, 376 (Va. 1988) (holding that state 
parole officers did not have control over the parolee and thus owed no duty to 
victims of crimes committed by parolee). 
 458. See Nasser v. Parker, 455 S.E.2d 502, 505–06 (Va. 1995) (rejecting 
Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California). 
 459. See VA. CODE § 8.01-38 (2014) (allowing for liability of a hospital to the 
extent of its liability insurance policy with minimum limits of $500,000 so long 
as the injured patient pays for the hospital’s services); Thrasher v. Winand, 389 
S.E.2d 699, 701 (Va. 1990) (“It is a well-settled rule in Virginia that charitable 
institutions are immune from liability based upon claims of negligence asserted 
by those who accept their charitable benefits.”).  
 460. See Spencer v. Commonwealth, 393 S.E.2d 609, 621 (Va. 1990) 
(rejecting explicitly Frye and following essentially the Daubert test). But cf. John 
v. Im, 559 S.E.2d 694, 697–98 (Va. 2002) (warning that court has neither 
adopted nor rejected the analysis of Daubert).  
 461. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.005 (2015) (adopted 1981) (providing for 
pure comparative fault). 
 462. See Davis v. State, 30 P.3d 460, 462 (Wash. 2001) (“[T]he duty of care a 
landowner owes to a person depends upon whether the person is an invitee, a 
licensee, or a trespasser.”). 
 463. See Frobig v. Gordon, 881 P.2d 226, 228 (Wash. 1994) (“[T]he general 
rule is that a landlord is not responsible . . . for conditions which 
develop . . . after possession has been transferred.”).   
 464. See Kamla v. Space Needle Corp., 52 P.3d 472, 478 (Wash. 2002) (“A 
landowner is liable for harm caused by an open and obvious danger if the 
landowner should have anticipated the harm, despite the open and obvious 
nature of the danger.”). 
KEEPING CASES FROM BLACK JURIES 651 
                                                                                                     
 465. See Barrett v. Lucky Seven Saloon, Inc., 96 P.3d 386, 393 (Wash. 2004) 
(finding commercial provider of intoxicating beverages liable for injuries caused 
by a drunk driver).  
 466. See Taggart v. State, 822 P.2d 243, 257 (Wash. 1992) (“[P]arole officers 
have a duty to protect others from reasonably foreseeable dangers engendered 
by parolees’ dangerous propensities.”).  
 467.  See WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.120(2) (2015) (establishing a “duty to 
warn” if an individual “has communicated an actual threat of physical violence 
against a reasonably identifiable victim or victims” to a mental health 
professional); Peterson v. State, 671 P.2d 230, 239 (Wash. 1983) (noting that a 
therapist has “a duty to take reasonable precautions to protect anyone who 
might foreseeably be endangered” by patient). 
 468. See Pierce v. Yakima Valley Mem’l Hosp. Ass’n, 260 P.2d 765, 775 
(Wash. 1953) (“[A] charitable, nonprofit hospital should no longer be held 
immune from liability for injuries to paying patients.”); see also Friend v. Cove 
Methodist Church, Inc., 396 P.2d 546, 550 (Wash. 1964) (abrogating immunity 
“in the case of an injured nonpaying patron” and not just “in the case of an 
injured paying patron”).  
 469. See State v. Riker, 869 P.2d 43, 50 (Wash. 1994) (following Frye). 
 470. The percentage of African-Americans in each city is taken from 2010 
U.S. Census data. State & County QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/index.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2016) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). For both Louisville and Lexington, 
Kentucky, this information was not available using U.S. Census data. In the 
case of Louisville, we used countywide data, and in the case of Lexington, we 
used the available data from Lexington-Fayette. Id. 
 471. See supra note 274 and accompanying text (describing the Gini 
coefficient). The Gini coefficient values included in Table 3 are calculated from 
the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2009–2013 American Community Survey 5-Year 
Estimates. See Steve Batt, Gini Index of Income Inequality for U.S. Counties, 
UCONN: OUTSIDE THE NEATLINE (Jan. 28, 2014), http://blogs.lib.uconn.edu/ 
outsidetheneatline/2014/01/28/gini-index-of-income-inequality-for-u-s-counties/ 
(last visited Feb. 18, 2016) (reporting Gini coefficients for each county) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Six municipalities included in our 
study crossed county lines: Birmingham, Alabama; Chicago, Illinois; both 
Raleigh and Durham, North Carolina; and Charleston and North Charleston 
(combined) and Columbia, South Carolina. For each of these municipalities, we 
calculated a weighted mean for the Gini coefficient.   
 472. See generally RICHARD C. FORDING, UPDATED AND REVISED CITIZEN AND 
GOVERNMENT IDEOLOGY MEASURES THROUGH 2010 (Sept. 12, 2012) (providing 
NOMINATE values used in this study); see also supra notes 282–285 and 
accompanying text (explaining NOMINATE values and how they are 
calculated).   
 473. See Fording, supra note 472 (providing NOMINATE values used in this 
study); see also supra notes 282–285 and accompanying text (describing what 
NOMINATE values are and the process for NOMINATE calculations). 
 474. The JADI scores are rounded to the nearest whole number. 
